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Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests
in Public Health: The National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program and Its
Influence During the Last Two Decades
Lainie Rutkow,* Brad Maggy,** Joanna
Zablotsky,*** and Thomas R. Oliver****
I. Introduction
Vaccines are widely hailed as one of the greatest medical and public
health accomplishments of the twentieth century.' Every year, vaccines
prevent untold numbers of people from contracting potentially fatal
diseases.2 Because vaccines are so effective and have such visibly
positive results, it is easy to forget that they carry a modicum of risk.
Some people who receive vaccinations, for reasons that are not entirely
understood, experience reactions such as anaphylactic shock, seizures,
and, occasionally, death.3 These consequences raise the following
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Hopkins Universities; Candidate for Ph.D., Department of Health Policy & Management,
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; J.D., New York University School of
Law; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; B.A., Yale University.
** Candidate for Ph.D., Department of Health Policy & Management, Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; M.P.A., California State University at
Hayward; B.A., University of California at Berkeley.
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Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
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1. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-
1999: Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children, 48 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 244 (1999).
2. Id. at 243.
3. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Update: Vaccine Side Effects, Adverse
Reactions, Contraindications, and Precautions: Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. RR-12,
Sept. 6, 1996, at 4-5.
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question: When the government recommends that members of the public
receive a vaccine and some people are subsequently injured by that
vaccine, what role should the government play?
The United States first faced this question in 1976. 4 About sixty
years earlier, in 1918, influenza swept the globe and left twenty million
people dead.5 In early 1976, a soldier at Fort Dix, New Jersey, died from
a strain of influenza that was markedly similar to the 1918 virus.6 Public
health officials at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
feared that this was the beginning of a similar pandemic.7 At their
urging, the federal government initiated a swine flu immunization
campaign with visible support from President Gerald Ford.8
Public health and government officials assumed "that the vaccine
manufacturers would gladly produce[,] for a fee close to cost[,] the
needed vaccine." 9 They did not anticipate that vaccine manufacturers
and their insurers would not participate in such a massive campaign
unless the government provided some form of liability protection to
them.'0 Given these concerns and the rapidly approaching flu season,
Congress quickly passed the National Swine Flu Immunization Program
(Swine Flu Act)." President Ford signed the Act into law on August 12,
1976.12 The Act transferred any liability on the part of the vaccine
manufacturers and administrators to the United States government. 13 In
other words, the United States became liable "for personal injury or
death arising out of the administration of swine flu vaccine under the
swine flu program.... 14
Vaccinations began on October 1, 1976; ultimately, over forty-five
million people were vaccinated. 15  But, several months into the
campaign, only a few cases of the deadly influenza had emerged. On
December 16, 1976, the government halted the campaign for two
4. Richard Krause, The Swine Flu Episode and the Fog of Epidemics, 12 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 40, 41-42 (2006).
5. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Researchers Reconstruct
1918 Pandemic Influenza Virus; Effort Designed to Advance Preparedness (Oct. 5, 2005)
(on file with authors).
6. Krause, supra note 4, at 41.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 93 (1985) [hereinafter INST. OF
MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 93-94.
12. National Swine Flu Immunization Program, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113
(1976).
13. INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 93 (quoting
Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2(k)(2)(A)).
14. Id.
15. Krause, supra note 4, at 41.
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reasons: 1) a flu pandemic seemed unlikely, and 2) reports had emerged
that one out of every 100,000 people who received the vaccine developed
Guillain-Barr6 syndrome.'16  Guillain-Barr6 syndrome is a rare
neurological disorder that can lead to paralysis. 17 Because the swine flu
campaign was so widely publicized, and many cases of Guillain-Barr6
syndrome emerged, a flood of lawsuits appeared. 18 Due to the Swine Flu
Act's liability provisions, the federal government was the defendant for
each of those claims.' 9  This resulted in the government devoting
countless hours and millions of dollars to defending itself and,
eventually, paying awards to Guillain-Barr6 victims. 20  It is widely
accepted that the swine flu program was a disaster, resulting from hasty
decisions by the CDC, presidential advisors, and a Congress that
believed a deadly flu pandemic was imminent.2 '
Ten years later, the nation faced a shortage of childhood vaccines
because manufacturers, who were exiting the market, lacked strong
liability protections. 22 With the swine flu episode a not-so-distant
memory, Congress fashioned a no-fault, ideally non-adversarial system
to compensate the families of children who were injured after receiving a
vaccination.23 It took Congress over three years to pass the final
legislation that created the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (VICP); 24 the program has remained in effect for nearly twenty
years.25 During the last few years, when the government has considered
massive vaccine campaigns for seasonal influenza and smallpox, the
16. INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 95.
17. Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government's
Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine
Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 7, 13 (2005).
18. INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 95.
19. Id. at 95-111.
20. Id.
21. See generally RICHARD NEUSTADT & HARVEY FINEBERG, THE EPIDEMIC THAT
NEVER WAS: POLICY MAKING AND THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR 17, 17-49 (1983) (detailing
policy-making process that surrounded swine flu scare); Georgene Vairo, Remedies for
Victims of Terrorism, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1265, 1293 (2002) ("[O]ne of the few times
Congress involved itself in the personal injury realm was in the case of the Swine Flu
disaster several decades ago when the federal government itself was one of the culpable
targets."); Elyse Tanouve, The Vaccine Business Gets a Shot in the Arm, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 25, 1988, at BI ("A raft of lawsuits over adverse reactions to vaccines for 'swine
flu' and other diseases followed."); Abigail Trafford, It's Deja Flu All Over Again,
WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005, at Fl ("The disease turned out to be a phantom. There was
no flu epidemic. Worse, the vaccine caused illness.").
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.A-B.
24. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3756 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to -34 (2000)).
25. Id.
2007]
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VICP has served as a model program for congressional members.
Congress's concerns about vaccine injury compensation and
manufacturer and administrator liability are especially relevant today, as
experts predict that the country, and the world, may soon face a deadly
avian flu pandemic.27
With these issues in mind, it is useful to consider the forces that led
to the creation of the VICP, and how the program has impacted
subsequent vaccination campaigns in the United States. Part II of this
article will explain the fundamental elements of the VICP. Part III will
explore the program's genesis as well as the development of its funding
mechanisms. Part IV will apply theoretical frameworks to the story told
in Part III, to aid in understanding how Congress came to pass the VICP.
Part V will evaluate criticisms that the VICP has faced during its first
twenty years. Finally, Part VI will explore how the lessons learned from
the VICP's creation can be applied to contemporary vaccine injury
issues, such as the emerging threat of avian flu.
II. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
A. Jurisdiction, Governance, and Funding
The VICP provides a no-fault compensation system that acts as an
alternative to filing tort claims against vaccine manufacturers and
administrators. 28  "No-fault" means that if certain predetermined
conditions are met, a person will automatically receive an award from the
VICP. 29 In other words, once a person qualifies to receive compensation
from the VICP, there is no need to demonstrate fault on the part of the
vaccine manufacturer or administrator.
The VICP is housed in the Division of Vaccine Injury
Compensation, which is part of the Health Resources and Services
Administration in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS).30 Administration of the VICP rests primarily with the DHHS,
but also involves the Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ). 3 1  The Advisory Commission on
26. See infra Part VI.A-B.
27. See infra Part VI.D.
28. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3756.
29. See, e.g., William J. Gaine, No-Fault Compensation Systems, 326 BRIT. MED. J.
997, 998 (2003).
30. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Fact Sheet: National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/factsheets/fs-tableIV_docl.htm (last
visited August 4, 2006).
31. Id.
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Childhood Vaccines, whose nine members are appointed by the DHHS
Secretary, is charged, inter alia, with "advis[ing] the Secretary on the
implementation of the [VICP]; ... recommend[ing] changes in the
[VICP]; [and] recommend[ing] to the Director of the National Vaccine
Program research related to vaccine injuries which should be conducted
to carry out the [VICP].
32
The Commission is composed of three health professionals who are
not government employees. 33  At least two are pediatricians with
expertise in the epidemiology and prevention of childhood diseases and
adverse reactions associated with vaccines.34 The next three members of
the Commission are drawn from the general public, and at least two
represent children who experienced a vaccine-related injury or death.35
The final three members of the Commission are lawyers.36 At least one
specializes in representing families of children who experienced a
vaccine-related injury or death and at least one represents a vaccine
manufacturer. 37 Non-voting, ex officio Commission members include
the Director of the National Institutes of Health, the Assistant Secretary
for Health, the Director of the CDC, and the Commissioner of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). 38 The Commission holds no less than
four public meetings a year.39 During these meetings, the Commission
receives briefings from those who contribute to the VICP's
administration, such as representatives from the DHHS's Division of
Vaccine Injury Compensation. ° In addition, Commission members
report on the progress of the Commission's working groups.4n
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(f) (2006).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(a)(1)(A) (2006).
34. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(a)(1)(B) (2006).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(a)(1)(C) (2006).
37. The current members of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines are:
Don L. Wilbur, MD (Oklahoma City Clinic), Suzanne Hudson Vaughn, Robert P. Fuller,
MD (Department of Traumatology & Emergency Medicine, University of Connecticut
Health Center), Margaret Ann Barnett Stern, JD (Texas Children's Hospital), Loren G.
Cooper, JD (US Legal Operations, Dispute Resolutions and Prevention,
GlaxoSmithKline), Marguerite Evans Willner, Jaime G. Deville, MD (Department of
Pediatrics Infectious Diseases, University of California-Los Angeles), William P. Glass,
Jr., JD (Glass & Glass), and Robin Stavola. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Advisory
Commission on Childhood Vaccines Roster, http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/
roster.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2006).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(a)(2) (2006).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(c) (2006).
40. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Minutes from the Advisory Commission on
Childhood Vaccines Meeting, Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/
accvmin 12-12-05.htm.
41. E.g.,
[T]he Workgroup agreed on two overarching principles in the Guiding
Principles. First, the [Vaccine Injury] Table should be scientifically and
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The VICP is funded through two separate streams. For injuries
related to vaccines that were administered before October 1, 1988,
funding is drawn from federal tax dollars appropriated by Congress.4 2
This stream accounts for $110 million a year.43 For injuries related to
vaccines that were administered on or after October 1, 1988, funding is
provided by the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund.44 The money
in that fund comes from an excise tax, levied upon the consumer, of
$0.75 on every dose of vaccine that is covered by the VICP. 45 In fiscal
year 2005, the trust fund contained over $2.2 billion.46 That year, the
trust fund collected $196 million in revenue; $123 million was collected
through the excise tax and $73 million was generated from interest. 47 In
an average year, the VICP pays $50 to $75 million in awards.48
B. Procedures and Processes
A person can qualify to receive compensation from the VICP
through one of three means: 1) the person shows that an injury listed on
the VICP's Vaccine Injury Table occurred; 2) the person proves that a
vaccine caused his or her condition; or 3) the person proves that a
vaccine aggravated a previously existing condition. 49  The Vaccine
Injury Table lists the vaccines covered by the VICP as well as
compensable injuries and the timeframe following vaccination within
which the injury must have occurred. 50 For example, a person would be
eligible for VICP compensation if he or she received a measles, mumps,
and rubella (MMR) vaccination and experienced anaphylactic shock zero
to four hours later.
The Vaccine Injury Table can be amended by regulations
promulgated by the DHHS Secretary. 5  The Secretary must request
recommendations and comments from the Advisory Commission on
medically credible. Second, from a policy perspective, where there is credible
scientific and medical evidence both to support and to reject a proposed change
to the [Vaccine Injury] Table, the change should be made to the benefit of
petitioners.
Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i)-(j) (2006).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(j) (2006).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i) (2006).
45. Nat'l Immunization Program, CDC Vaccine Price List, Oct. 31, 2006,
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vfc/cdcvac-price-list.htm.
46. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Minutes, supra note 40.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 1(c) (2006).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (2006); see Appendix A: Vaccine Injury Table.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c) (2006).
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Childhood Vaccines for any proposed changes to the Table.52 These
changes can "add to, or delete from, the list of injuries, disabilities,
illnesses, conditions, and deaths for which compensation may be
provided or may change the time periods for the first symptom or
manifestation of the onset or the significant aggravation of any such
injury, disability, illness, condition, or death., 53  In addition, the
Secretary must amend the Table to include any vaccine that the CDC
recommends for "routine administration to children.
' 54
Any person, child or adult, who believes that he or she was injured
by a vaccine listed on the Vaccine Injury Table can apply to the VICP for
compensation.55 If the person in question died, then his or her estate or
legal guardian can apply to the VICP.5 6 A person can initiate contact
with the VICP by filing a petition with the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims.57 The Claims Court's clerk will "immediately forward the filed
petition to the chief special master for assignment to a special master.,
58
Once he or she receives a petition, a special master will "issue a
decision... with respect to whether compensation is to be provided
under the Program and the amount of such compensation., 59 The person
who filed the petition can then decide to accept the special master's
award or appeal it to the Claims Court.6 ° Once the Claims Court issues a
decision, the petitioner can decide to accept the compensation, decline
the compensation and leave the VICP to file a civil suit, or appeal the
decision.61  The Claims Court's decision can be appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and, ultimately, to the U.S.
Supreme Court.62
VICP awards are subject to a number of restrictions. Pain and
suffering awards are limited to $250,000 and punitive damages are
prohibited.63 Awards can include compensation for medical expenses,
loss of earning capacity, and reasonable attorney's fees.64 In addition, if
the person in question died, then the award is capped at $250,000 plus
52. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(d) (2006).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c)(3) (2006).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(e) (2006).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 1(b) (2006).
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 1(a) (2006).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (a)(1) (2006). The Claims Court can appoint up to eight
special masters for terms of four years. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d) (2006).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A) (2006).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e) (2006).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-12(e), 21 (2006).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f) (2006).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-15(a)(4), 15(d) (2006).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-15(a), 15(e)(1)(A) (2006).
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attorney's fees.65  Since its inception, over 11,000 petitions have been
filed with the VICP. 66 The average award is $824,463.67
A person can directly sue a vaccine administrator or manufacturer
under the following conditions: 1) the person's petition was deemed
non-compensable and dismissed by the VICP; 2) the person rejects the
compensation granted by the VICP; or 3) the vaccine in question is not
covered by the VICP. 68 If someone chooses to exit the VICP system and
go to court, there are limitations on the available theories of tort liability.
Liability against vaccine manufacturers is prohibited if the injury or
death was "unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared
and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings., 69 Essentially,
this means that the injured person can prevail only in certain types of
situations, such as when the manufacturer conducted "insufficient
testing, or produc[ed] [] a 'bad batch' of vaccine. 7°
III. Creation of the VICP
A. Establishment of the Program
In April 1982, the television network NBC aired a program entitled
"DPT: Vaccine Roulette" that portrayed the harmful adverse effects
experienced by some children following administration of the diphtheria,
pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine. 7 1 These adverse reactions were
largely attributed to the pertussis vaccine (the "P" in DPT). Several local
radio stations picked up the story. On April 19, Kathi Williams, the
mother of a child who suffered a severe reaction after receiving the DPT
vaccine, called a radio station "to see if there was something being done
by local parents. 72 The station took her name and number and said that,
65. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2) (2006).
66. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
Statistics Reports, http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statistics-report.htm (last
visited Aug. 4, 2006).
67. Health Res. & Servs. Admin, Frequently Asked Questions: Award Amounts
Under VICP, http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2006).
68. Health Res. & Servs. Admin, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
Strategic Plan, Apr. 2006, ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/strategic-
Plan_20060411 .pdf.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006).
70. John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1027, 1097-98 (2003).
71. DPT: Vaccine Roulette (NBC television broadcast Apr. 1982); INST. OF MED.,
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PERTUSSIS AND RUBELLA VACCINES 323 (Christopher P. Howson et
al., eds. 1991).
72. Immunization and Preventive Medicine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and General Oversight of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
97th Cong. 79 (1982) [hereinafter Hearing on Immunization and Preventive Medicine]
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if they received similar calls, they would put the callers in touch with
her.73 By the end of the day, the station had received calls from three
other parents.7 4 After speaking with these parents, Williams realized that
they "were all hearing basically the same stories. Generally [they] found
that most parents did not know the pertussis vaccine had severe side
effects. 75 These parents decided to form a group to offer support and
information to other concerned parents. They named the group
Dissatisfied Parents Together.76 The group's acronym, DPT, was a
deliberate choice to clearly link the group to the DPT vaccine.77
About a month later, the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations and General Oversight
held a hearing about Immunization and Preventive Medicine.78 Senator
Paula Hawkins (R-FL), chairperson of the Subcommittee, invited
multiple stakeholders to testify. 79 Kathi Williams and Marge Grant
represented Dissatisfied Parents Together and detailed the post-
vaccination reactions suffered by their children. 80 William H. Foege,
Director of the CDC, expressed the agency's concerns about vaccine
safety. 81 He explained that, while most children experience no reaction
after receiving the DPT vaccine, "a prospective study at UCLA on over
15,000 doses [of the vaccine] showed nine children with convulsions and
nine with episodes of collapse, for a frequency of 1 in 1,750
immunizations for each complication.' 82 After acknowledging this
complication rate, Foege urged the Subcommittee to recognize that the
"DPT: Vaccine Roulette" program presented only one side of the
vaccine safety issue. He explained that, while the program
provided an excellent portrayal of the human suffering and pain
which result from pertussis vaccine .... the documentary failed to
clearly spell out the price of the disease. It did not show mental
(testimony of Kathi Williams, Dissatisfied Parents Together).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act: Hearing on S.
2117 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong. 49 (1984)
[hereinafter Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act]
(testimony of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents Together).
78. See Hearing on Immunization and Preventive Medicine, supra note 72.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 79 (testimony of Kathi Williams & Marge Grant, Dissatisfied Parents
Together).
81. Id. at 6 (testimony of William H. Foege, Director, CDC).
82. Id.; see Christopher L. Cody et al., Nature and Rates of Adverse Reactions
Associated with DPT and DT Immunizations in Infants and Children, 68 PEDIATRICS 650,
652-55 (1981).
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retardation caused by pertussis disease. It provided no feel for an
outbreak of pertussis with children of a village whooping through the
night. It provided no pictures of caskets of small children who are
victims of a preventable disease.
83
With this statement, Foege summarized one of the intrinsic dilemmas in
vaccine policy brought out by the hearing: while the DPT vaccine was
effective at preventing a devastating childhood disease, it would
inevitably cause a small number of children to suffer permanent severe
disabilities.
84
By the start of the next Congress, Senator Hawkins was determined
to craft a bill aimed at providing compensation to families of children
who were injured by vaccines. Her interest in the issue was not
surprising; as a survivor of child abuse, s5 she had developed a clear
record as an advocate for children's issues.s6 As acting chairperson of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Hawkins held
another hearing on the pertussis component of the DPT vaccine on July
22, 1983.87 By this time, Dissatisfied Parents Together had become more
formalized and was run by a governing board.88 When the group heard
that Hawkins wanted to develop a vaccine compensation program, they
used the hearing as an opportunity to suggest guidelines for the bill.
Jeffrey Schwartz, the father of a child who died after receiving a vaccine
and the new president of DPT, asked that any compensation program
expressly acknowledge that pertussis vaccines can, and in some cases
do, cause serious reactions, including seizures, brain damage, and
even death. [And], the bill must not simply be an effort to sweep the
DPT vaccine problem under the rug.... The bill should contain
positive commitments and incentives to reduce the risk of reaction to
83. Hearing on Immunization and Preventive Medicine, supra note 72, at 6-7
(testimony of William H. Foege, Director, CDC).
84. Id.
85. Nadine Brozan, A Senator Recounts Her Own Experience as an Abused Child,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1984, at Al ("[Hawkins] told a crowded hearing that she had been
abused when she was a child by a 'neighbor, a man around the corner."'); see also PAULA
HAWKINS, CHILDREN AT RISK, MY FIGHT AGAINST CHILD ABUSE: A PERSONAL STORY AND
A PUBLIC PLEA (1986).
86. See, e.g., Phil Gailey, For Senator Hawkins, A Debatable First Year, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1981, at B18 ("Her major legislative achievement is a proposal to give
$500 million in tax breaks to working mothers who have to put their children in day care
centers. She is also pushing legislation on the problem of missing children."); Ellen
Hume, Sen. Paula Hawkins Struggles in Reelection Bid to Overcome Challenge from
Popular Governor, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 1 (naming Hawkins's priorities as
"drugs and family violence").
87. Task Force Report on Pertussis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong. (1983).
88. Id. at 50 (statement of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents
Together).
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the current vaccine and promote development of safer vaccines.
89
Schwartz's request anticipated the debate that would dominate
negotiations to develop a vaccine compensation program: how could
Congress create a program that would compensate the families of
vaccine-injured children and simultaneously provide incentives for
vaccine manufacturers to develop safer products?
By the middle of the 98th Congress, vaccine compensation bills had
been introduced by Hawkins in the Senate and by Henry Waxman (D-
CA) in the House of Representatives.9" Waxman's concern appeared
natural, given his interest in health and safety as well as his chairmanship
of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. 91 In
addition, Waxman was skilled at constructively working with the
pharmaceutical industry. He was in the midst of successfully brokering
an agreement with drug manufacturers that would "foster the invention
of new drugs and lower the price of older drugs coming off patent."9
On May 3, 1984, Hawkins held a hearing about her proposed
compensation plan bill, S. 21 17. She opened the hearing by explaining
that her intention was "not to frighten parents away from immunizing
their children against childhood diseases, nor [was] it to assess any
blame. My intent is simply to improve our Nation's immunization
program so that it better achieves its original goal of safeguarding our
children's health., 94 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who seconded
Hawkins's sentiments, succinctly stated Congress's concerns:
We must be able to get vaccines to children in the right time and
place, at an acceptable cost and without creating exorbitant and
unpredictable legal difficulties. We must be able to assure parents
that when their children are the victims of an appropriate and rational
national policy, a compassionate Government will assist them in their
hour of need. We cannot tolerate a system which discourages
immunization, increases the risks to the very children in need of
89. Id.
90. S. 2117, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R. 5810, 98th Cong. (1984).
91. See, e.g., Auto Rental Concerns Answer Safety Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1983, at B It ("At a news conference Tuesday, Representative Henry Waxman, Democrat
of California, accused officials of the Federal Trade Commission of 'sitting on their
hands' and blocking an investigation into complaints that the rental firms had poor
records in complying with recall orders."); Editorial, Cutting the Wrong Health Care,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1981, at A14 ('If this [Medicaid] "cap" is adopted, millions will
suffer and no "safety net" will catch them,' warns Representative Henry Waxman, the
chairman of a House subcommittee on health.").
92. H.R. 3605, 98th Cong. (1984); Editorial, How Much Haven for Drug Pioneers?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1984, at A14.
93. S. 2117, 98th Cong. (1984).
94. Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act, supra
note 77, at 1 (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins).
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protection, and encourages litigation within a tort system which
awards few handsomely and sends others equally aggrieved away
penniless.
95
The Committee then heard from representatives from all sides of the
vaccine compensation debate, including the government, aggrieved
families, pharmaceutical companies, and trade organizations.
96
Edward M. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary of DHHS, testified on
behalf of the government. He explained that, although the bill had "a
laudable goal," it also contained "major weaknesses which [made] it
impossible for [DHHS] to support. 97 Because the bill contained a list of
injuries or conditions that would be compensated, Brandt feared that the
bill established "a strong presumption that vaccine[s] [are] responsible
for essentially any adverse condition that happens after immunization
unless there is incontrovertible evidence of other causation." 98  Next,
Brandt explained that, based on calculations done by the Congressional
Budget Office, the bill would cost the Federal Treasury nearly $5 billion
in its first three years alone. 99  Finally, Brandt took on the bill's
retroactivity provision. Because the bill would have allowed
compensation for vaccine-related injuries that occurred before the
proposed law took effect, Brandt felt that the public's confidence in
immunizations would be even further undermined. 100
Opposition to the bill continued when Alan R. Nelson, a member of
the American Medical Association's (AMA) Board of Trustees, testified.
Nelson's concerns were distinct from Brandt's. Nelson began by
explaining that "[b]eneficial legislation should strike a fair balance
between the desirable goal of compensating the victims of serious
injuries and the need for vaccine-producing companies to operate in an
environment with some measure of protection from the extremely high
legal costs [that result from lawsuits by aggrieved families]." 101
While the bill would have established a federal compensation
95. Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
96. See Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act, supra
note 77.
97. Id. at 7 (testimony of Edward M. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary, DHHS).
98. Id. at 7-8.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. Brandt's testimony was indicative of an administration that was reluctant to
expand the role of the federal government. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wehr, Dying Children
Prompt Legislation: National Health Policy Sought for Organ Transplant Surgery, 1984
CONG. Q. 453 ('Its objectives can be achieved without legislation,' according to Dr.
Edward N. Brandt, Jr., assistant secretary for health at the Department of Health and
Human Services. 'I just do not believe that direct government involvement in the
procurement of organs will necessarily improve the system any further ...').
101. Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act, supra
note 77, at 180 (testimony of Alan R. Nelson, Board of Trustees, AMA).
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program for families of vaccine-injured children, it would have also
preserved the option for these families to sue vaccine manufacturers and
administrators in the traditional tort system. 102 Nelson believed that this
would not provide "sufficient protection" against "the high expense of
litigation that is driving [vaccine] manufacturers' costs up ... 103
Nelson made clear that as long as "private tort remedy" remained an
option, the AMA would not support the proposed compensation
program. 104
John E. Lyons, President of Merck Sharp & Dohme, a vaccine
manufacturer, echoed Nelson's concerns. He likened the current torts
system to "a lottery" and explained that "[i]f a compensation system
promptly and fairly compensates all injured persons for their actual
losses, there is no need to continue the tort system alternative."'10 5 He
advocated for a no-fault compensation system that would be the
exclusive remedy available to vaccine-injured children. 10 6 However, he
did admit that the tort system could play a role in providing
compensation. Lyons said that "when a manufacturer fails to produce a
vaccine in accordance with Government standards or a health care
provider fails to administer the vaccine in accordance with medical
standards, the tort system should be open for an injured party to
recover."' 10 7  In other words, Lyons wanted to see a compensation
program that eliminated the tort system option except in cases where a
vaccine manufacturer had deviated from FDA guidelines.
Despite strong opposition from DHHS and vaccine manufacturers,
some groups testified to express great support for the proposed program.
Jeffrey Schwartz spoke on behalf of Dissatisfied Parents Together and
voiced the group's support for the compensation program.1 °8 Martin H.
Smith, President-elect of the American Academy of Pediatrics, explained
that his group had commissioned its own estimate of the proposed
program's costs, which came in at about one-fourth of the DHHS
numbers. 10 9 He also reminded the Committee that "[t]he present day
102. S.2117,98th Cong. (1984).
103. Id.
104. Id.; see Philip M. Boffey, Vaccine Liability Threatens Supplies, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1984, at C1 ("The American Medical Association at its annual meeting last
week approved a report calling for the Federal Government to assume responsibility for
compensating the victims of mandatory childhood immunization programs, relieving the
manufacturers of liability risk unless they are negligent.").
105. Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act, supra
note 77, at 277 (testimony of John E. Lyons, President, Merck Sharp & Dohme).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 278.
108. Id. at 49-51 (testimony of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents
Together).
109. Id. at 147 (testimony of Martin H. Smith, President-elect, American Academy of
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liability cost under the tort process is incorporated into the present-day
cost of the vaccines. That cost involved in the vaccines could be reduced
in proportion to the acceptance of a compensation system."" In his
opinion, a well-run compensation program could actually lower the cost
of vaccines, making them easier for parents to purchase and, in turn,
bringing continued revenues to vaccine manufacturers.
After this hearing, the fate of Hawkins's bill remained unclear. Her
bill had bipartisan support from the following three co-sponsors: Orrin
Hatch (R-UT), Slade Gorton (R-WA), and Spark Matsunaga (D-HI).
I"'
Many Senators had told Hawkins that they were uncomfortable co-
sponsoring her bill because it would still allow families to sue vaccine
manufacturers directly. However, those Senators intimated that if that
provision were removed, they would support the bill."I
2
A few months later, as many had predicted, the dire situation of
vaccine manufacturers leaving the market began to emerge. On
December 12, 1984, Connaught Laboratories, a U.S. pharmaceutical
company, announced that it would no longer distribute the pertussis
vaccine (a component of the DPT vaccine).' 1 3 Six months earlier, Wyeth
Laboratories, another U.S. pharmaceutical company, had announced that
it would no longer distribute pertussis vaccine due to high litigation
costs."14  Similarly, Connaught chose to withdraw from the market
"rather than pay sharply higher rates for liability insurance." ' 5  Both
companies were responding to a series of lawsuits brought by parents
who believed that their children had been injured by the pertussis
vaccine. 116 This left only one pharmaceutical company in the nation that
would manufacture and distribute the vaccine, a product which is given
to virtually every child in the country."17 Health experts predicted that
this would exacerbate already existing shortages of some childhood
Pediatrics).
110. Id.
111. Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act, supra
note 77, at 120 (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins).
112. Id.
113. Stephen Engelberg, Maker of Vaccine Quits the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1984, at A21.
114. S. REP. No. 99-483, at 3 (1986).
115. Engelberg, Quits the Market, supra note 113; Richard Levine, Risk Forces Out
Vaccine Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1984, at A7 ("Connaught said it was quitting
because of a sharp increase in the cost of insurance against lawsuits brought on behalf of
children who suffer effects that can include brain damage and death.").
116. Elizabeth Wehr, Concern in Congress: Looming Vaccine Shortage Blamed on
Threat of Lawsuits, 1984 CONG. Q. 3146 [hereinafter Wehr, Concern in Congress]
("Vaccine reactions have provoked lawsuits whose costs, according to the drug firms, are
intolerable.").
117. Engelberg, Quits the Market, supra note 113.
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vaccines. 18
The next day, December 13, 1984, the CDC asked physicians to
delay giving DPT booster shots to older children. 1 9 This would, they
hoped, ensure that enough DPT vaccine remained available to immunize
infants. The CDC acted after Lederle Laboratories, the only remaining
U.S. manufacturer and distributor of pertussis vaccine, produced two
batches of the vaccine that did not meet the company's own standards.1
20
Members of Congress who had been following the exodus of
American companies from the vaccine market recognized the crisis:
parents of children who were injured by vaccines wanted to retain the
right to sue vaccine manufacturers, yet vaccine manufacturers would
rather exit the market than face multi-million dollar lawsuits. 121 In the
House and Senate, respectively, Waxman's and Hawkins's bills, which
proposed essentially the same compensation program, continued to spark
heated testimony at congressional hearings. While the bills' proposed
systems required parents to first explore the options provided by the
compensation system, the door still remained open for parents to directly
sue vaccine manufacturers.
At a hearing on Waxman's bill, H.R. 5810,122 before the House
Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment on December 19, 1984, Jeffrey Schwartz, the President of
Dissatisfied Parents Together, again expressed the need for this type of
legislation. 2 3 He, along with other parents at the hearing, reminded the
Subcommittee that, in their opinion, only lawsuits can "reveal company
negligence and force improvements."' 124  However, vaccine
manufacturers, the AMA, and the Reagan administration all expressed
reservations about the proposed legislation. 125 Their positions were the
118. Id.
119. Wehr, Concern in Congress, supra note 116, at 3146; Editorial, The Whooping
Cough Crisis Once Killed 7,000 American Children a Year and Infected 265,000 More.
It May Again Become a Major Killer if the Problems Now Swirling Around the Vaccine
are Not Speedily Resolved, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1984, at A34 ("The [pertussis] vaccine
is in temporary shortage, forcing the Government to recommend that doctors delay
booster shots.").
120. Wehr, Concern in Congress, supra note 116, at 3146.
121. Id.
122. H.R. 5810, 98th Cong. (1984).
123. Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 5810 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.
(1984) [hereinafter Hearing on Vaccine Injury Compensation] (testimony of Jeffrey H.
Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents Together).
124. See Wehr, Concern in Congress, supra note 116, at 3146; see also Peter D.
Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The Case
of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 769, 788 (1999) (discussing
importance of discovery for revealing information during litigation).
125. Wehr, Concern in Congress, supra note 116, at 3146.
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same as those stated at the hearings on Hawkins's bill seven months
earlier; these groups felt that if the government was going to provide a
compensation fund for children injured by vaccines, then vaccine
manufacturers should be entirely indemnified, with the threat of litigation
permanently removed. 2 6 Waxman later responded to these concerns,
explaining that the current shortage of pertussis vaccine should not
"'stampede' Congress into assuming all the legal risks of immunization
programs."12 7 He also warned that, while it might be possible for the
government to relieve pharmaceutical companies of some liability,
"[t]his Government should not be in the business of guaranteeing profits
to the drug industry."'
128
The 98th Congress never reached resolution on the vaccine
compensation program. However, in the next session of Congress, both
Waxman and Hawkins reintroduced their vaccine compensation bills.
129
A few months later, on April 25, 1985, the CDC announced that the
shortage of pertussis vaccine had been alleviated. 130  Connaught
Laboratories had secured a new insurance arrangement, which allowed it
to resume manufacturing and distributing the vaccine. 131 That same
month, the Reagan administration announced that it hoped to put forth its
own proposal for vaccine injury compensation. 132 The main feature of
this plan would be the elimination of punitive damages for any vaccine-
related claim and a cap of $100,000 on awards for pain and emotional
distress.1
33
Although the vaccine shortage had been momentarily relieved,
Congress continued to consider a vaccine compensation fund. The
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources conducted two
rounds of hearings on Hawkins's bill, S. 827.134 The bill proposed a
vaccine compensation system that was nearly identical to the one set
forth during the 98th Congress. 135 The bill would apply to children who
were injured after receiving one of the seven mandated childhood
vaccines. 136 These vaccines would be listed on a Vaccine Injury Table,
which would designate the adverse reactions that were covered and the
126. Id.
127. Stephen Engelberg, Can Medicine Rely on the Rule of the Marketplace?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1985, at A8.
128. Id.
129. S. 827, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 5546, 99th Cong. (1986).
130. CDC Says Vaccine Shortage Easing, 1985 CONG. Q. 865.
131. Id.
132. Robert Pear, U.S. Plan to Curb Damage Claims Aims to Avert Vaccine
Shortages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1985, at Al.
133. Id.
134. S. 827, 99th Cong. (1985).
135. Id.
136. INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 183.
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timeframe in which they must have occurred. The proposed no-fault
compensation program would have a non-exclusive option, meaning that
families could elect either to sue vaccine manufacturers or accept money
from the compensation program.137  Manufacturers would receive a
degree of protection in the tort system: they could not be sued merely for
their failure to directly warn parents about adverse reactions.1 38  In
addition, the bill proposed a nine-member advisory commission to
"advise the Secretary of Health and Human Services ... on the
implementation of that program; recommend changes in the Vaccine
Injury Table; recommend ways to improve the safety, efficacy, and
supply of vaccines; and recommend changes in surcharge and research
priorities.,,1 39  To finance the program, the bill proposed initially
borrowing funds from general revenues and subsequently imposing an
"annual surcharge on the manufacturer of each vaccine covered by the
act."
140
The first hearing on S. 827 began on July 18, 1985. Hawkins
opened the hearing by suggesting a growing sense of collaboration:
I am encouraged by the willingness of the vaccine manufacturers to
speak openly and honestly about the problems and pressures facing
them, as an industry; I'm encouraged by the parents that meet with
us. I am encouraged by the pediatricians' willingness to review and
to modify their original bill in order to address the concerns of other
parties to this issue. I am very encouraged by the willingness of my
Senate and House colleagues to address this now, before we are in
another crisis situation.... 141
Yet, by the second round of hearings on the bill, it became apparent that
all stakeholders were standing firmly by their previously stated
positions. 42 Hawkins could not find common ground between vaccine
manufacturers and the parents of children injured by vaccines. In the
Republican-controlled Senate, the bill was stalled.
1 43
In the Democratic-controlled House, Waxman's bill, H.R. 5546,144
was faring much better. Waxman refused to make the vaccine
137. Special Report: Legislative Summary HEALTH, 1985 CONG. Q. 2741; INST. OF
MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 184.
138. INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 184.
139. Id. at 183.
140. Id. at 185.
141. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1985: Hearing on S.
827 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 6 (1985)
(statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins).
142. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1985, Part 2: Hearing
on S. 827 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. (1985).
143. Special Report: Legislative Summary HEALTH, supra note 137, at 2742.
144. H.R. 5546, 99th Cong. (1986).
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compensation program an exclusive option. He insisted that "the tort
system [serves] as a constant incentive to regulators and manufacturers
alike to keep the vaccine supply as safe as it can be." 145 His bill, which
was very similar to Hawkins's, created "a mechanism whereby families
of children who can demonstrate an injury as a result of an adverse
vaccine reaction would be automatically entitled to compensation."'
146
Awards for pain and suffering or death would be capped at $250,000.141
Special masters, who would be appointed by U.S. district courts from
across the country, would determine precise award amounts.148 Once a
special master had determined an award, a family would have ninety
days "either to accept the award or file suit in state or federal court, with
no limits placed on recovery for pain and suffering or injuries resulting in
death."' 149  However, families who chose the litigation route would
forever forfeit their ability to receive compensation from the proposed
federal program. 5 ° Like Hawkins's proposed system, the compensation
program would be funded by "an excise tax on vaccine
manufacturers." 151
Throughout the summer of 1986, Waxman emphasized in hearings
that his bill represented a compromise:
I recognize that the bill I have introduced is probably not the first
choice of most parties to this controversy. Manufacturers would
undoubtedly prefer greater insulation from liability. Parents of
injured children would certainly prefer larger compensation and
fewer restrictions on court activity. The Reagan administration
would, I am sure, prefer legislation that spends no money.152
Although Hawkins had adopted this same language of compromise, she
had no luck crafting an arrangement that would receive bipartisan
support in the Senate. As a result, Hawkins eliminated the compensation
145. Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 2 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearing on Vaccine Injury Compensation 1986] (statement of Rep. Henry
Waxman).
146. Julie Rovner & Dave Kaplan, Compensation Bill, Stockpile Measure: Vaccine
Legislation Advances in House Committee, 'on Floor, 1986 CONG. Q. 2243. The
compensation would include "expenses for medical care, rehabilitation, special
education, residential and custodial care, lost wages, and other 'reasonably necessary
services."' Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Julie Rovner, House Passes Vaccine-Injury Compensation Bill, 1986 CONG. Q.
2626 [hereinafter Rovner, House Passes Bill].
152. Hearing on Vaccine Injury Compensation 1986, supra note 145, at 2 (statement
of Rep. Henry Waxman).
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fund provisions and instead refocused the bill on collecting data on
adverse reactions to vaccines as well as encouraging research into safer
vaccines. 153 On August 6, 1986, the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee approved the revised version of Hawkins's bill. 5 4 About a
month later, the House Energy and Commerce Committee approved
Waxman's bill by a voice vote.
155
But, the bill could not go before the full House until the Ways and
Means Committee consented to the funding mechanism for the
compensation scheme. Members of the Ways and Means Committee
claimed that they did not have time to consider the excise tax option, and
Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) voiced philosophical
concerns about the bill. 156 "Every time you have a problem do you set up
another trust find?[,]" asked a Committee spokesperson. 15 7 Thus, the
funding provisions were struck from the bill. While Waxman was
disappointed with this, his aides expressed hope that passage of the
revised bill "would prevent us from having to start back at square one in
the next Congress."' 158 On October 14, 1986, the House passed H.R.
5546, which included no provisions for funding the vaccine
compensation program. 1
59
Four days later, on October 18, the last day of the 99th Congress,
Congress passed S. 1744,160 an omnibus health package that included the
unfunded vaccine compensation program.' 6' The vaccine section of the
bill "[d]irected the secretary of health and human services to create a
National Vaccine Program and to appoint a director to coordinate federal
research, licensing and distribution of vaccines.'' 162 In addition, the bill
called for the creation of "a national advisory committee to help the
program director ensure a continued supply of safe and effective
vaccines and to establish research priorities for enhancing safety and
efficacy.' 63  And, the bill contained provisions for a vaccine
compensation program drawn directly from Waxman's bill, H.R. 5564.164
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, a no-fault program,
would provide compensation to the families of children who had
153. S. REP. No. 99-483, at 3 (1986).
154. Julie Rovner, House, Senate Panels Approve Vaccine Bills, 1986 CONG. Q. 1828.
155. Rovner & Kaplan, supra note 146, at 2243; H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 35 (1986).
156. Rovner, House Passes Bill, supra note 151, at 2626.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. S. 1744, 99th Cong. (1986).
161. The 99th Congress: A Mixed Record of Success, 1986 CONG. Q. 2662.
162. Julie Rovner, Major Provisions of Nine-Part Omnibus Health Bill, 1986 CONG.
Q. 2952 [hereinafter Rovner, Major Provisions].
163. Id.
164. H.R. 5564, 99th Cong. (1986).
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"suffer[ed] vaccine-related injuries or death as a result of receiving
vaccines generally required by state law."' 165 To begin the compensation
process, a person would first have to "file a petition in U.S. district court
for the district in which the injury or death occurred or in which they
reside, and with HHS."'16 6 Next, the person would have to demonstrate
that he or she had "received a vaccine covered by the bill, [and] that as a
result of the vaccine the recipient was injured or had a previous injury
aggravated, [or] that the injury's effects caused death.... ,,167 A special
master, appointed by the district court in which the petition was filed,
would "determine whether a particular injury qualifie[d] for
compensation and how much the award should be.' 68 The award could
include payment for medical expenses, lost earnings, pain and suffering,
and attorneys' fees. However, "no punitive damages [would be]
allowed."' 169 Awards for pain and suffering or for death would be capped
at $250,000.1
7
0
Once an award had been determined, a person would have ninety
days either to accept the award or to reject the award and pursue
litigation.'17  If the person chose to accept the award from the
compensation program, he or she could not then sue a vaccine
manufacturer. 72  If litigation was initiated, "vaccine manufacturers
[would] not be held liable for damages for an injury resulting from an
unavoidable side effect if the vaccine was properly prepared and was
accompanied by proper directions and warnings."'173 The "directions and
warnings" would correspond to FDA guidelines. 174  In addition,
manufacturers would "not be held liable for punitive damages unless the
plaintiff [could] show wrongful or illegal acts by the manufacturer that
[were] related to the injury in question."'
' 75
The passage of S. 1744 resulted from a compromise negotiated
between Waxman, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee's Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, and Orrin
Hatch, chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee. 176 In addition, Representative Edward R. Madigan (R-1L),
165. Rovner, Major Provisions, supra note 162, at 2952.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Rovner, Major Provisions, supra note 162, at 2952.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Julie Rovner, Omnibus Health Bill May Face Reagan Veto, 1986 CONG. Q. 2712
[hereinafter Rovner, Reagan Veto].
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the ranking member on the House's Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, and Senator Edward Kennedy, the ranking member on the
Senate's Labor and Human Resources Committee, helped to craft the
arrangement. 77 This bipartisan effort occurred because both Waxman
and Hatch had major pieces of legislation that were in jeopardy of dying
in committee. Waxman wanted to see the vaccine compensation
program pass. 178  Hatch had also prioritized a bill that would allow
"drugs not approved by the United States Government [to] be exported to
any of 21 foreign countries if they were approved for use there."'1 79 The
Senate had passed the bill, but Waxman had allowed it "to languish in
subcommittee."'' 80 The Reagan administration's support for Hatch's bill
was tremendous; Vice President George H.W. Bush, Commerce
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, and U.S. Trade Representative Clayton K.
Yeutter all called for President Reagan to sign the bill.' 81 C. Boyden
Gray, counsel to Vice President Bush, reported that the vice president
believed this portion of the bill "would help American companies remain
competitive in international markets."'
' 82
However, Justice Department officials urged the President to veto
any omnibus health bill that contained the vaccine compensation system.
John R. Bolton, an Assistant Attorney General, summarized the
administration's opposition to the system as follows: "[i]t would...
create a [major] new compensation program for which 'no legitimate
national need has been demonstrated.' . . . [I]t would lead to 'a dramatic
increase' in the role of the Federal judiciary, which would rule on injury
claims. ' 83  Bolton echoed concerns that had already been voiced by
members of the House Judiciary Committee: the role of the courts
remained unclear because "the bill [did] not explain how the special
masters [would] be appointed or what standards they [would] use for
their decisions."' 184 In addition, during his testimony Bolton explained
177. Id.
178. Rovner, Reagan Veto, supra note 176, at 2712; Robert Pear, President's Aides
Divide on Signing of a Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1986, at Al ("Representative
Henry A. Waxman, Democrat of California, said, 'I cannot see why President Reagan
would not sign this excellent bill, which guarantees supply of vaccine and compensation
of children who are injured by vaccines."').
179. S. 1848, 99th Cong. (1986); Pear, President's Aides, supra note 178. "The
countries include[d] Austria, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany."
Id.; see also Phil Gailey, Legislators Head Home After Final Flurry of Bills, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1986, at B12.
180. Rovner, Reagan Veto, supra note 176, at 2712.
181. Pear, President's Aides, supra note 178; Robert Pear, Reagan Signs Bill on Drug
Exports and Payment for Vaccine Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1986, at 1.
182. Pear, President's Aides, supra note 178.
183. Id.
184. Rovner, Major Provisions, supra note 162, at 2952. However, members of the
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that "'the Administration strongly opposes the imposition of any new
tax' such as the excise tax envisioned in the bill. 1 85 Vice President Bush
had called Waxman earlier in the month to urge him to support the drug
export legislation. 86 At the time, that legislation was separate from the
vaccine compensation system.
Waxman and Hatch wanted to ensure the omnibus bill's passage, so
they included several smaller, but influential pieces of proposed
legislation along with the drug export and vaccine compensation bills.
187
First, they added a bill that would repeal the "authorization for the
federal health planning program,"' 88 which they knew the administration
would support. The program "sought to slow rising health care costs by
requiring states to set up approval systems before hospitals could add
new beds or make major equipment purchases."1 89 The administration
had sought to repeal the program since 1981.190 Also, Waxman and
Hatch knew that Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-OH) strongly
opposed Hatch's drug export bill.' 9' To appease him, they included a bill
that Metzenbaum had co-sponsored that would "expand research into
Alzheimer's disease and efforts to help victims and their families."',
92
Due to the vaccine compensation program, Reagan repeatedly
threatened to veto S. 1744 both before and after Congress passed the
legislation. 193 However, he ultimately signed the bill on November 14,
1986.194 He took action primarily to legalize the drug export provisions
and expressed "serious reservations" about the vaccine compensation
program, particularly in terms of its anticipated funding mechanism. 1
95
Judiciary Committee had suggested that "there [might] be an effort to enact clarifying
legislation [about the special masters] in early 1987." Id.
185. Pear, President's Aides, supra note 178.
186. Id.
187. Rovner, Reagan Veto, supra note 176, at 2712.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Julie Rovner, Senate Loosens Restraints on Drug Exports, 1986 CONG. Q. 1105
("Approval of the bill, charged Metzenbaum, is tantamount to 'opening the door to the
dumping of potentially unsafe and ineffective drugs on the Third World."').
192. Rovner, Reagan Veto, supra note 176, at 2712.
193. See, e.g., id. ("Although an administration official said no decision has been
made on whether to veto the package, the White House objects to the vaccine
provision .. "); Pear, U.S. Plan to Curb Damage, supra note 132 ("Administration
officials said they considered and decided against proposals to create a federally
sponsored vaccine compensation fund .... ).
194. Rovner, Reagan Veto, supra note 176, at 2712.
195. Pear, Reagan Signs Bill, supra note 181.
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B. Funding of the Program
Early in the 100th Congress, on March 5, 1987, the House Ways
and Means Committee's Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures
held a hearing to determine how the vaccine compensation program
would be funded. 196  Waxman opened the hearing by reminding the
Subcommittee that the program represented a compromise between
"conservatives, liberals, consumer advocates, and pharmaceutical
lobbyists."'' 97 He made one request of the Subcommittee:
Whatever form of financing this committee arrives at, one criterion
must be met. The funding mechanism for the compensation program
must be reliable. We are, through this act, asking some families with
injured children to waive their rights to sue forever. We cannot
expect these people to give up fundamental rights if they cannot
depend on the compensation payments. And if they do not give up
these rights, the national vaccine injury compensation program will
not work as it is designed to do. The results of such a failure would
be a continuation of the courtroom lottery for compensation and a
genuine threat of vaccine shortages and disease epidemics.1
9 8
The Committee then heard testimony from the Department of the
Treasury, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and trade organizations.
Dennis E. Ross, the Treasury's Tax Legislative Counsel, detailed
the administration's objections to the law. He explained that, because
the tort system remained an option, "many injured persons with
potentially large claims, particularly for pain and suffering, would still
resort to the tort system."' 199 As stated during the 99th Congress, the
administration believed that this would leave vaccine manufacturers
facing the same type of "financial ruin" that they currently feared.2 °0
And, Ross expressed concerns about the costs of administering a federal
compensation program.20  Finally, he suggested that any public funding
stream would present sustainability issues. He explained that funding the
compensation program through an excise tax was
perhaps the least attractive alternative. In the first place creation of a
new excise tax and a related trust fund would entail substantial
196. Funding of the Childhood Vaccine Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. (1987)
[hereinafter Hearing on the Funding of the Childhood Vaccine Program].
197. Id. at 10 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
198. Id. at 11.
199. Id. at 18 (testimony of Dennis E. Ross, Tax Legislative Counsel, Dep't of the
Treasury).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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administrative costs. More importantly, however,.., funding the
Vaccine Act's compensation program through an excise tax would
create a substantial risk. The program would either operate at a
deficit or be unable to compensate many injured persons. Since
excise tax rates could be adjusted by Congress, maintenance of an
adequate funding level would depend on reasonably accurate
predictions of the numbers and amounts of claims.
202
Ross stated similar concerns about appropriations as a funding source:
because appropriations could be "reduced or eliminated as part of the
annual budget process,.... injured persons may have little incentive to
accept awards under the compensation program...., 2 03
Douglas MacMaster, President of Merck Sharp & Dohme, urged the
Subcommittee and others testifying at the hearing to "set aside" the issue
of manufacturer liability. 20 4 Instead, he suggested that "all parties work
toward a fiscally and financially sound funding mechanism so this
worthwhile program can begin., 20 5 He seconded the Treasury's concern
that the program be funded with a stable revenue source, and expressed
similar worries about the unpredictable nature of appropriations.20 6
However, he questioned Ross's claim that an excise tax could not work.
Instead, he reported that, after considering the issue for several years,
Merck had concluded that "a trust fund financed through the imposition
of a surcharge or an excise tax on pediatric vaccines could be made
fiscally sound.,
207
When Committee members worried that an excise tax would draw a
presidential veto, Waxman admonished them:
There is always a threat of veto .... There was a threat of veto of this
bill but the President did sign it. In addition, there are ways of
packaging proposals so that the President would find it unattractive to
veto it. I can't believe that when you have a compensation system for
children that are hurt from vaccines that when it came down to it, he
would veto it.
208
Waxman spoke with confidence to a Democratic-controlled House.20 9
202. Hearing on the Funding of the Childhood Vaccine Program, supra note 196, at
19; see Spencer Rich, Administration Attacks Vaccine Law; '86 Act Calls for 'No-Fault'
Compensation to Injured Children, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1987, at A6.
203. Hearing on the Funding of the Childhood Vaccine Program, supra note 197, at
20; see Rich, supra note 202.
204. Hearing on the Funding of the Childhood Vaccine Program, supra note 197, at
88 (testimony of Douglas MacMaster, President, Merck Sharp & Dohme).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 15 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
209. Haynes Johnson, The Power Conflict in Iran-Contra Affair; Reagan Policies,
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And, ultimately, his prediction would be proven correct.
On July 13, 1987, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Select Revenue Measures revisited how to fund the vaccine
compensation program.2'0  After a two-hour, closed-door meeting, the
subcommittee decided to defer to the full committee. 21  However, the
subcommittee did agree to "use general revenues to create a trust fund to
compensate 3,500 children injured or killed by vaccines prior to
enactment of [the vaccine compensation program]. '12 Staffers estimated
that this fund would cost "a total of $315 million, with $54 million
necessary for fiscal 1988.,213 The subcommittee was reluctant to tackle a
financing plan for future injuries or deaths because "cost estimates
[were] still uncertain. ' '21 4 For example, an estimate by the Congressional
Budget Office would have placed a tax of $8.04 on each dose of DPT
* 215vaccine. But, "there [was] general agreement that an excise tax over
$5 per dose would be counterproductive because it would result in fewer
children getting vaccinated., 21 6 Committee staffers spent the rest of the
summer trying to create a system that would yield an excise tax of less
than $5 per vaccine dose.
Over the next few months, lawmakers struggled to develop a way to
fund the vaccine compensation system that would ensure that children
continued to be vaccinated, appropriately compensate the families of
children who were injured by vaccines, and hopefully avoid a
presidential veto. In mid-October 1987, Waxman presented a new
framework for funding the program to the House Energy and Commerce
217Committee. He suggested providing separate sources of funding for
Congress Undergo Trial, WASH. POST, May 31, 1987, at A4 ("Not since the Vietnam war
has there been so serious a debate about the respective constitutional roles and
responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches of governments."); Waxman's
attitude toward a presidential veto may have been influenced by Reagan's weakened
reputation in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal. E.g., Haynes Johnson, Unsettling
Portrait of Reagan Presidency; Hearings Tell a Story of Contempt, WASH. POST, June 14,
1987, at A16.
210. Julie Rovner, 'No-Fault' System Waiting in Wings: Still No Agreement on
Funding for Vaccine Compensation Plan, 1987 CONG. Q. 1594 [hereinafter Rovner,
Waiting in Wings].
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.; Julie Rovner, Cost-Paring Move May Not Avert Veto: Vaccine
Compensation Plan Cut Back by Two House Panels, 1987 CONG. Q. 2516 [hereinafter
Rovner, Cost-Paring Move].
216. Rovner, Waiting in Wings, supra note 211, at 1594.
217. The House Energy and Commerce Committee "maintains principal
responsibility for legislative oversight relating to telecommunications, consumer
protection, food and drug safety, public health, air quality and environmental health, the
supply and delivery of energy, and interstate and foreign commerce in general." The
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cases that arose before and after the October 1, 1988 implementation of
the VICP. Children who were injured by vaccines administered before
that date would be eligible to receive "compensation for all medical
expenses and up to $30,000 in miscellaneous costs, and would be paid
from appropriations .... ,,218 Appropriations would be $80 million a year
for the next four years. 219 For children who were injured by vaccines
administered on or after October 1, 1988, compensation would be paid
out of a trust fund financed by an excise tax on certain vaccines.22° In
addition, the system would be limited to paying an average of 150 claims
over a twelve-month period.22' If this number were exceeded, "the
secretary of Health and Human Services would be required to notify
Congress and shut down the program to new applications.... 222 These
changes garnered approval from the Energy and Commerce Committee
on October 14, 1987. Waxman regretted scaling back the program, but
he knew that if changes were not made, "'it would make a nullity of last
year's bill, and no one would benefit.'
223
The next day, October 15, 1987, the House Ways and Means
Committee approved Waxman's revised funding scheme.224 However,
the committee only authorized the new excise taxes for four years. The
following excise taxes were agreed upon: $4.56/dose for DPT;
$4.44/dose for MMR; $0.29/dose for polio.
225
About a week later, the funding provisions for the vaccine
compensation program were added to the already enormous omnibus
budget reconciliation bill, "where [they might] be less vulnerable to
veto.''226 H.R. 3545 contained an additional provision that might have
made the bill more appealing to the administration. The bill altered the
jurisdictional structure of the 1986 vaccine compensation program.
Committee on Energy & Commerce, About the Committee,
http://energycommerce.house.gov/aboutCommittee.htm (last visited July 19, 2006).
218. Rovner, Cost-Paring Move, supra note 215, at 2516. Miscellaneous costs would
include attorneys' fees, lost earnings, and pain and suffering. Major Provisions of the
Fiscal 1988 Reconciliation Bill, 1988 CONG. Q. 73.
219. Rovner, Cost-Paring Move, supra note 215, at 2516.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. Miscellaneous costs would include attorneys' fees, lost earnings, and pain
and suffering. Major Provisions of the Fiscal 1988 Reconciliation Bill, supra note 218,
at 73-85. The House Ways and Means Committee's jurisdiction includes federal revenue
measures, the bonded debt of the United States, national social security programs, and
trade and tariff legislation. H.R. REP. No. 108-810, at 122-25 (2005).
225. Rovner, Cost-Paring Move, supra note 215, at 2516.
226. Spencer Rich, Far-Reaching Medical Programs in the Works; Congressional
Committees Prepare AIDS Funding, No-Fault Child- Vaccine Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 21,
1987, at A21.
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Originally, claims had to be filed with the U.S. District Court in the
region in which the injured person lived or in the region where the injury
occurred.227 The administration had complained that this could put a
tremendous strain on the judicial system. 228  H.R. 3545 moved
jurisdiction to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.229  This meant that
claims could no longer be filed with district courts across the country; the
Claims Court would serve as a centralized repository that would decrease
the burden on local systems.
By the time the omnibus bill reached the Senate, it had gone
"through so many incarnations that even some of its sponsors had
difficulty keeping up. '230 This worked to the advantage of the vaccine
compensation program's funding provisions. Because the Senate, with
its new Democratic majority, had so many other issues to discuss
regarding the omnibus bill,231 and the funding provisions had been a last-
minute addition, they received virtually no direct attention from the
Senate.232 On October 27, 1987, the Senate sent the final version of the
bill to the House. A week later, the House cleared the bill, S. 1158,233
and sent it to the President. In late December, facing a solidly
Democratic Congress, Reagan signed the bill, funding the VICP.
234
IV. Application of Theoretical Frameworks to the Creation of the VICP
In an effort to understand the policy processes at work during the
creation of the VICP, two prominent models of policy formation will be
considered. The first is John Kingdon's model of agenda setting, in
which governmental handling of an issue depends on the interaction of
three "process streams. ' 235 As Kingdon explains:
The three major process streams in the federal government are
(1) problem recognition, (2) the formation and refining of policy
proposals, and (3) politics. First, various problems come to capture
the attention'of people in and around government.... Second, there
227. Rovner, Major Provisions, supra note 162, at 2952.
228. Pear, President's Aides, supra note 178.
229. Julie Rovner, Nursing Homes, Vaccine Injuries, Rural Health: Reconciliation
Bill Includes Several Key Health Changes, 1988 CONG. Q. 72 [hereinafter Rovner,
Nursing Homes]; H.R. CONF. REp. No. 100-495, at 771-72 (1987).
230. Julie Rovner, Research, Manpower and Vaccine Reauthorizations: Omnibus
Health-Programs Bill Cleared for President Reagan, 1987 CONG. Q. 2744.
231. See, e.g., Senate Votes to Reauthorize Health Programs, 1987 CONG. Q. 1692.
232. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-495, at 771-73.
233. S. 1158, 100th Cong. (1987).
234. Major Provisions of The Fiscal 1988 Reconciliation Bill, supra note 218, at 73;
Rovner, Nursing Homes, supra note 229, at 72.
235. JoHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 86-89 (2d
ed. 2003).
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is a policy community of specialists-bureaucrats, people in the
planning and evaluation and in the budget offices, Hill staffers,
academics, interest groups, researchers-which concentrates on
generating proposals .... Third, the political stream is composed of
things like swings of national mood, vagaries of public opinion,
election results, changes of administration, shifts in partisan or
ideological distributions in Congress, and interest group pressure
campaigns.
236
Kingdon argues that these processes or streams act upon each other and,
when acting in concert, they can provide the basis for substantial policy
change.237 The power of the Kingdon model, particularly as it aids in
understanding the creation of the VICP, is that it provides a theoretical
basis for explaining both the substance and timing of significant policy
change. At the same time, the model accounts for the extreme difficulty
that advocates for such policy change often face.
Fundamental aspects of another well-known model, disjointed
incrementalism, 238 also apply to selected events in the creation of the
VICP. This model helps explain certain aspects of governmental
decision-making and subsequent public policy. Disjointed
incrementalism is grounded upon the notion that policy does not emerge
from rational-comprehensive analysis and decision-making. 239 Rather,
policy results from the constant interplay between myriad interested
individuals and groups. Additionally, inherent in the model's
explanation of policy development, the levels and branches of
government, with their institutionally-defined checks and balances, all
act in accordance with their own interests, needs, and limitations. 240 This
fractionalized process takes place within the reality of both time
constraints and limited information. The resulting policy decisions are
typically incremental, departing only marginally from current policy.
24'
It follows from this model that significant change, while rarely occurring
under any circumstance, is almost always the result of many successive
incremental changes; these incremental changes are likely not connected
by any well-defined longer term goals and objectives.242
There are two objectives connected to the juxtaposition of these
conceptual models: 1) to develop a clear understanding of the processes
236. Id. at 87.
237. Id. at 90-164.
238. MICHAEL T. HAYES, INCREMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 13-25 (1992).
239. See id. at 13-16; CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & EDWARD J. WOODHOUSE, THE POLICY
MAKING PROCESS (3d ed. 1992).
240. See HAYES, supra note 238, at 13-25.
241. Id. at 17.
242. Id. at 20.
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involved in the passage of the VICP with identification of key pivotal
points, and 2) to demonstrate how two apparently competing models of
the policy-making process-the Kingdon framework and disjointed
incrementalism-can actually complement each other in explaining the
outcomes of complex situations and events.
A. The Build-up to a Focusing Event
In 1982, the television documentary "DPT: Vaccine Roulette"
brought public attention to the problem posed by the potential adverse
243medical effects of certain vaccines. This documentary led to the
creation of Dissatisfied Parents Together. 244 Most importantly for the
evolution of the VICP, this unifying group afforded a focal point to
aggrieved parents which, in turn, contributed to an increase in the
number of lawsuits filed by the families of children who suffered adverse
effects from vaccines.245
Perhaps the most severe consequence of the substantial increase in
litigation involved the near total elimination of available liability
insurance for vaccine manufacturers.246 Whatever insurance remained
was available at greatly increased rates and with substantially increased
deductibles. In short, manufacturing childhood vaccines was rapidly
losing its financial viability for pharmaceutical companies. From this
arose the situation in which a single domestic source, Lederle
Laboratories, remained as a manufacturer of DPT vaccine.247 Further,
the continued participation of Lederle was also problematic. The
company experienced great difficulty in obtaining insurance coverage
and was concerned as well with the impact of continued participation
upon its bottom line.248
As examined from the perspective of the Kingdon model, two
interrelated events followed. First, the problem definition underwent an
important transformation. Specifically, the problem went from one
concerning the essentially unnoticed impact of a small number of parents
suing large and powerful pharmaceutical companies to a problem where,
due to the exit of manufacturers, America's children might well be
denied life-saving vaccinations. As a result of this transformation, the
issue of ensuring an adequate supply of safe childhood vaccines made its
243. See supra Part IllA; Elizabeth A. Breen, Note, A One Shot Deal: The National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 309, 315 (1999).
244. See supra Part III.A.
245. Breen, supra note 243, at 315-16.
246. Greenberger, supra note 17, at 13-14.
247. Stephen Engelberg, Official Explains Gaffe on Vaccine Shortage, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1984, atA21.
248. See id.
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way onto the national policy agenda. It became part of the group of
problems and subjects the federal government and those connected to it
considered important enough to warrant study and potential action. In
other words, due to what Kingdon terms a "focusing event," the issue of
vaccine manufacturing and supply became a part of the problem
stream.149 A complex pivotal event is involved here: the focusing event
necessary to place the issue of manufacturer liability within the problem
stream first necessitated a transformation of the problem into one
concerning the safety of the nation's children.
It appears that this policy agenda issue was most likely confined to
children for several reasons. The social construction of the vaccine
injury problem was most effective with an emphasis on children. 250 This
provided a relatively safe political format for those legislators who
supported the proposed system. Additionally, young children receive an
inordinate share of vaccines and concomitantly suffer the majority of
adverse reactions, so it made sense to focus on them. 251  Lastly, and
following from this, throughout the course of the VICP legislation's
development and implementation, the official accounting of vaccine-
related injuries, the Vaccine Injury Table, contained only childhood
vaccines 2  This made it difficult to forecast the cost of adult vaccine
reactions.
Disjointed incrementalism offers a complementary explanation of
these same events. Disjointed incrementalism, while not requiring
focusing events, allows for them as a vehicle to get issues onto the
national agenda.253 According to the Lindblom model, such problems
become defined in fundamentally remedial terms. This model parameter
is consistent with the circumstances of the VICP. A specific problem
existed, namely an unstable supply of childhood vaccine due to
manufacturers exiting the market.254 Further, the focus was clearly upon
finding a solution that would remediate this specific problem. At this
249. KINGDON, supra note 236, at 94-100.
250. See Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, Social Construction of Target
Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy, 87 AM. POL. SC. REv. 334, 336-37
(1993).
251. Cf Dru Stevenson, Libertarian Paternalism: The Cocaine Vaccine as a Test
Case for the Sunstein/Thaler Model, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & URB. PO'Y 4, n.170 (2005).
A child born today will receive five doses of DPT, four doses of polio vaccine,
two doses of measles, mumps, and rubella, three injections of hepatitis B, one
shot of varicella (chicken pox), four doses of haemophilus influenzae b (Hib),
four injections of a pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, and, depending on where
the child lives, perhaps one shot of hepatitis A.
Id.
252. See supra Part Il.
253. HAYES, supra note 238, at 31-32.
254. See supra Part III.A.
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point in the analysis, the incremental model and the Kingdon model
provide complementary explanations of the initial events that led to the
VICP: both models incorporate an explanatory focusing event and
propose to deal with the problem in a way intended to result in the same
outcome.
B. Coalescing of Interests
In 1984, Representative Henry Waxman and Senator Paula Hawkins
introduced legislation in their respective chambers to create a federal
vaccine injury compensation fund.255 Beyond the introduction of similar
bills, no evidence in the VICP's legislative history suggests that these
two legislators viewed themselves as working together to get the
program passed.
As resolution of the childhood vaccine problem attained formal
status in proposed federal legislation, a coalescing of opposed sides
developed. The issue was not one of disagreement on the need to protect
the health of children-on that there is always agreement.256 Nor was the
issue one of providing some relief for the vaccine manufacturers; it was
abundantly clear that they were exiting the market, thereby endangering
the supply of vaccine. 7
Rather, the points of interest group contention were generally
distinguished as those attributed to the parents of vaccine-injured
children (with support from the American Academy of Pediatrics), 258 the
manufacturers,259 and the AMA.2 60 The parents required assurances that
any legislation would still allow them to obtain financial relief
commensurate with the harm done to their children. 261  The
manufacturers were intent upon receiving adequate tort relief so that they
could obtain affordable and sufficient liability insurance to ensure
255. See id.
256. E.g., Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act,
supra note 77, at 4 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) ("We cannot tolerate a system
which discourages immunization, [and] increases the risks to the very children in need of
protection .. "); id. at 7 (testimony of Edward M. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary,
DHHS) (explaining that the bill in question had a "laudable goal").
257. See supra Part III.A.
258. E.g., Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act,
supra note 77, at 49-51 (testimony of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents
Together) (expressing support for the bill); id. at 147 (testimony of Martin H. Smith,
President-elect, American Academy of Pediatrics).
259. E.g., id. at 277 (testimony of John E. Lyons, President, Merck Sharp & Dohme)
(expressing reservations about the bill).
260. Id. at 180 (testimony of Alan R. Nelson, Board of Trustees, AMA) (expressing
concerns about the bill).
261. See supra Part III.A.
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solvency and a reasonable return in the form of profits.2 62 The AMA
expressed interest in ensuring a stable vaccine supply but was primarily
concerned with limiting the liability of its members, who served as
vaccine administrators. 63
From inside the federal government, many Republicans, as well as
President Reagan and key administrative representatives, opposed any
legislation that would increase taxes and impact the tort system through
federal government intervention.2 64  Among the administration group
were senior Justice Department officials. 265  Also, as previously
discussed, DHHS Secretary Otis Bowen, through the testimony of
Assistant Secretary Edward M. Brandt, Jr., expressed strong opposition
to the plan.
266
In contrast, it appears that many within Congress, the majority being
Democrats, saw the issue in traditional Democratic terms. This
perspective includes the appropriateness, indeed requirement, for federal
intervention when the public good is at stake, the legitimacy of taxation
for the broader public good, and the necessity to insure critical social
welfare programs such as child immunizations.267 In accordance with
this reasoning, this group likely saw the proposed legislation as a way of
solving a critical social welfare problem and as a vehicle for furthering
federal intervention through specific forms of tort restriction.
As defined by Kingdon, the issue that divided those crafting policy
options, within Congress and the Reagan administration, was
compensation for the families of children who suffered adverse
immunization reactions.268 This broad issue was, in turn, divided into
two policy options. First, the no-fault compensation option could be the
exclusive remedy except in cases where the manufacturer deviated from
FDA guidelines. This option was represented principally by the AMA
and the pharmaceutical manufacturers. 269 The second entailed inclusion
of a compensation system in conjunction with continued availability of
the tort system. The primary advocates for this policy option were the
parents of vaccine-injured children and the American Academy of
Pediatrics.
270
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act,
supra note 77, at 7-8 (testimony of Edward M. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary, DHHS).
265. See Pear, President's Aides, supra note 178.
266. Hearing on the National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act, supra
note 77, at 7-8 (testimony of Edward M. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary, DHHS).
267. E.g., id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
268. See supra Part III.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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On December 19, 1984, hearings in the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee commenced. 27  The timing was causally
linked with a notable event and the current national mood. First, the
hearings were conducted just after news broke that all but one of the
DPT vaccine manufacturers had exited the market.272 Second, as is
consistent with the workings of the political stream in Kingdon's policy
model, the "national mood" toward this issue was evolving. For
example, an article in the New York Times addressed the issue of the
diminishing vaccine supply and, of greatest importance, the impact of the
thinning supply upon children.
273
The process of securing the program's approval extended from
December 1984 until December 1987, when the legislation, which
included funding provisions for the VICP, was finally signed by
President Reagan.274 Throughout this legislative process, stakeholders
accepted that a significant problem existed and, further, that the federal
government had some role to play in resolving this problem.275  The
points of contention were fairly constant and involved both the pragmatic
concern of funding with the attendant question of who should pay and
how.
C. The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs
Kingdon defines a "policy entrepreneur" as someone who is willing
"to invest their resources-time, energy, reputation, and sometimes
money-in the hope of a future return., 276 In the case of the VICP, both
Waxman and Hawkins played the role of policy entrepreneurs. They
advocated for a compensation system from the beginning and returned to
it throughout the legislative process.277
271. See generally Hearing on Vaccine Injury Compensation, supra note 123.
272. Wehr, Concern in Congress, supra note 116, at 3146.
273. Specifically, the article stated the following:
Connaught's withdrawal means that each vaccine for childhood diseases, those
used to prevent polio, measles, mumps, rubella, diphtheria, tetanus and
whooping cough, is now produced by a single manufacturer. The development
is likely to stimulate a drive by parents' groups and the drug companies to set
up a Federally sponsored system of compensation for children harmed by
vaccines.
Engelberg, Quits the Market, supra note 113.
274. Major Provisions of the Fiscal 1988 Reconciliation Bill, supra note 218, at 73;
Rovner, Nursing Homes, supra note 229, at 72.
275. See supra Part III.
276. KINGDON, supra note 236, at 122.
277. See supra Part III; cf Thomas R. Oliver & Pamela Paul-Shaheen, Translating
Ideas into Actions: Entrepreneurial Leadership in State Health Care Reforms, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 721,764 (1997).
In almost all situations, entrepreneurs must sell a prototype of their innovation
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What motivated Representative Waxman and Senator Hawkins? As
politicians, it is reasonable to assume that they each saw the issue of
securing life-saving vaccines for children as furthering their own policy
agendas regarding the role of government and child welfare.27 8 Hawkins
had established a record of being involved in children's issues and was a
vocal advocate about children's issues including child abuse.27 9 She was
also a victim of such abuse and wrote a book about her experiences in
1986.28 o Waxman was developing a record that showed interest in a
variety of health and safety issues.
281
It is possible, even likely, that either or both of them saw their
advocacy as furthering their respective reelections. Hawkins was facing
a very tough reelection race in Florida during this time,282 which she
ultimately lost. Waxman continues to serve in the House of
Representatives.
D. The "Softening Up" Process
"Softening up," another process described by Kingdon, can be
applied to the three years associated with the passage of the VICP
legislation. Softening up occurs to "insure that the relevant public is
ready for a certain type of proposal when its time does come. ' 283  As
policy entrepreneurs, both Waxman and Hawkins pushed for intervention
into the tort process. As is characteristic of entrepreneurs, they never
abandoned that focus. 284 Over time, members of Congress and those
connected to them became accepting of, or at least tolerated, the concept.
This is suggested by the VICP's ultimate passage. As this process
not only to interested investors but to a broader coalition of policy makers,
organized interests, and various segments of the public. They must be prepared
to demonstrate the superiority of their product to the status quo and other
legitimate alternatives.
Id.
278. Cf Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 277, at 748-49 (discussing the role of
policy entrepreneur in a problem-driven opportunity).
279. See supra Part III.
280. See generally HAWKINS, supra note 85.
281. See, e.g., Auto Rental Concerns Answer Safety Charges, supra note 91 ("At a
news conference Tuesday, Representative Henry Waxman, Democrat of California,
accused officials of the Federal Trade Commission of 'sitting on their hands' and
blocking an investigation into complaints that the rental firms had poor records in
complying with recall orders."); Editorial, supra note 91 ("'If this [Medicaid] "cap" is
adopted, millions will suffer and no "safety net" will catch them,' warns Representative
Henry Waxman, the chairman of a House subcommittee on health.").
282. Florida Governor Opens Senate Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1986, at D20 ("The
Governor, a Democrat, is seeking the seat held by Paula Hawkins, a Republican who has
said she will seek re-election in November.").
283. KJNGDON, supra note 236, at 128.
284. See supra Part III.
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evolved, competing interests managed to bargain and compromise on key
provisions. For example, vaccine manufacturers and the AMA preferred
total indemnification while parents, as represented by Dissatisfied
Parents Together, insisted on retaining their unencumbered right to
sue. 2 8  The successfully bargained compromise allowed limited, but
prompt no-fault compensation and access to the courts during a ninety-
day decision window in which the parents could accept or reject the
settlement offer.286
E. Consensus Building
Over time, bargaining and compromise, the work of the
entrepreneurs, as well as other factors such as the national mood and the
definition of the problem as caring for our children, created a consensus
for this legislation.287 As the process continued, opposition from the
Reagan administration remained as the principal obstacle. This objection
took the form of resistance to government taxation, sponsorship of
indemnification, and a strong ideological objection to federal
288involvement in the nation's tort system. At one point, the
administration attempted to derail the compensation plan by introducing
legislation that would have substantially altered the Waxman and
Hawkins bills.
289
Why, then, did President Reagan ultimately sign the legislation? On
November 15, 1986, he agreed to legislation that included the vaccine
compensation system.290 However, the legislation established the VICP
without a mechanism to fund the program. It can be inferred that it
remained his hope to effectively block implementation in this fashion.
Also, even given the lack of funding, he likely only signed the unfunded
compensation system bill because Congress placed the legislation within
an omnibus health bill that also contained other legislation he very much
favored. 291 This legislation, which Waxman had strategically bundled
with the VICP, involved the ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers to
sell domestically unapproved drugs to certain foreign countries.292
285. Id.
286. E.g., Rovner & Kaplan, supra note 146, at 2243.
287. KJNGDON, supra note 236, at 159-62.
288. See supra Part III.
289. Pear, U.S. Plan to Curb Damage, supra note 1332.
290. Pear, Reagan Signs Bill, supra note 181.
291. Id.
292. Id. See generally Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 277, at 768-72 (discussing
strategies of policy entrepreneurs, such as taking advantage of institutional procedures
like bundling legislation to advance their proposals).
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F. A Policy Window
Ultimately, legislation funding the VICP was signed by President
Reagan in December 1987.293 What factors led to this? First, as was the
case in the original authorizing legislation, the VICP funding provisions
were part of an omnibus package.294 Second, and of great importance,
was the opening of a new policy window. As discussed earlier,
according to the Kingdon model, the problem and policy streams had
been aligned for some time. Then, the political stream came into line
and with it a policy window emerged as a result of the 1986 mid-term
congressional elections. The Republicans lost a total of eight seats,
including five in the House and three in the Senate. 95 The loss of three
seats in the Senate was sufficient to return power to the Democrats.29 6
In short, the VICP bill milled about in the policy agenda for several
years. This, in part, was a consequence of continued bipartisan interest
in both houses.297 However, it appears that this bipartisanship did not
exist sufficiently in the Senate to allow passage of the compensation
program with attendant funding. The Democrats strongly favored this
bill, in accordance with typical party principles involving the proper role
of government as intervener, the acceptance of taxation for the common
good, and the centrality of social welfare issues. Once the Senate was
controlled by the Democratic Party, the bill's passage became more
likely. Further, this substantial power swing, and the impact resulting
from the Iran-Contra affair, left Reagan in a position of severely
diminished power and influence to oppose the VICP in Congress or pose
a credible veto threat.298
As argued above, the adoption of a fundamentally new and different
policy can be explained through the Kingdon model. How can this
explanation be enhanced by a consideration of disjointed
incrementalism? Disjointed incrementalism suggests that policy
outcomes are the result of the interaction of numerous and varied policy
actors all viewing the problem and its solutions differently from the
perspective of divergent values.299 As a result, the final policy is simply
293. Major Provisions of the Fiscal 1988 Reconciliation Bill, supra note 218, at 73;
Rovner, Nursing Homes, supra note 229, at 72.
294. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-495, at 771-73 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-1245.
295. Albert R. Hunt, Democrats Win, Sans an Agenda, No Help in '88, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 6, 1986, at 1.
296. Id.
297. See supra Part IILA-B.
298. E.g., George Lardner, Jr., Reagan Administration 's Ethics are Under Siege;
Nofziger Faces Trial; Iran Indictments Ahead, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1987, at A29.
299. HAYES, supra note 238, at 17-19.
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the product of all of those competing interests that happen to be engaged
in the issue at a given point in time.
Relative to the VICP, then, the history clearly shows some measure
of the final policy developing in this fashion. The competing interests of
the parents, the physicians, the manufacturers, the policy entrepreneurs,
the remaining concerned members of Congress in both houses, and the
administration all had their moments and impacted the final product.
300
The initial bills proposed by Hawkins and Waxman underwent numerous
adjustments, including the development of multiple potential funding
schemes, as the partisan bargaining process unfolded.
G. Reconciling the Models
In summary, both the Kingdon model and disjointed incrementalism
have certain factors in common that, taken together, can enhance a policy
analysis. 30 1 They both allow for the central role played by the multitude
of actors and interests that impact the policy process. They both accept,
either tacitly or expressly, the limits of rationality and how these limits
profoundly impact policy. While the Kingdon model attempts to explain
policy innovation that may represent a substantial departure from the
status quo in both substance and scale, the Lindblom model of disjointed
incrementalism can in fact help explain policies and programs that
establish a new role for government yet do not require large-scale
institutional change or economic resources.
V. Criticisms of the VICP During Its First Twenty Years
According to the DHHS, "[Congress] established the VICP to
ensure an adequate supply of vaccines, stabilize vaccine costs, and
establish and maintain an accessible and efficient forum for individuals
found to be injured by certain vaccines. '' 30 2 In addition to this goal,
however, the VICP was established to provide compensation "quickly,
easily, with certainty and generosity., 30 3 While the VICP program has
experienced moderate success in distributing funds to individuals who
have been injured by a vaccine, the program has been criticized for
failing to live up to some of the standards set by Congress when the
program was enacted. A report from the U.S. Government
300. See supra Part III.
301. See supra Part IV.
302. Health Res. & Servs. Admin, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
303. Robin J. Strongin & Eileen Salinsky, Who Will Pay for the Adverse Events
Resulting from Smallpox Vaccination? Liability and Compensation Issues, Nat'l Health
Policy Forum Issue Brief, Mar. 12, 2003, at 14, available at
http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs-ib/IB788-Smallpox-3-12-03.pdf.
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Accountability Office found that "the process has not been as quick or as
easy as expected., 30 4 And, public health law experts have concurred that
the "VICP in its current state has become adversarial, burdensome on
claimants, and time-consuming., 30 5  These criticisms can be broken
down into two categories: 1) slow process times for claims and 2)
ambiguity in changes to the Vaccine Injury Table.
A. Time to Process and Award Claims
Although the VICP has succeeded in reducing the number of
lawsuits brought under the tort system,30 6 critics claim that the program is
operating at a much slower pace than promised.30 7 Most VICP claims
take more than a year to process, with only fourteen percent of claims
settled in a year or less.30 8 Most claims are not settled within two years
of filing. 309 This can be attributed to the increased volume of claims as
the program progressed.310 In addition,
in 1990, HHS and DOJ began to increasingly scrutinize claims of
vaccine injury as funding to fully implement their legislated authority
under the program became available. DOJ established a cadre of
attorneys.., to represent HHS in hearings, and HHS established an
expert witness program to help assess whether alleged vaccine
injuries such as seizure disorders may have been present from birth or
were due to other causes.
311
As a result of the government's increasing expertise at running the VICP,
"petitioners were requested to provide supplementary medical records or
other information., 312 Because gathering medical records and related
304. U.S. Gov'T. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION: PROGRAM
CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY AND EASILY 2 (Dec. 1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00008.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE
INJURY COMPENSATION].
305. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics
and the Law, 295 JAMA 554, 555 (2006).
306. Breen, supra note 243, at 319-20.
307. Id.; U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 7.
308. Breen, supra note 243, at 319-20; U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 7.
309. Breen, supra note 243, at 319-20; U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 7; cf Jaclyn Shoshana Levine, Note, The National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Can It Still Protect an Essential Technology?, 4
B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 9, 47 (1998) ("[A]djudication delays today would not serve any
noble or useful purpose-they would only highlight administrative weakness.").
310. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 9.
311. Id. at 10.
312. Id. at 11; cf Susan G. Clark, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, The
National Childhood Injury Compensation Program, 94 EDUC. L. REP. 671, 677 (1994)
("Absent any medical records or opinion, no causal connection will be found.").
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information may involve consulting multiple hospitals and physicians,
most petitioners took more than a year to produce these materials.313 In
fact, the VICP's chief special master has reported that "while the court
could process claims more quickly, delays are granted primarily to
benefit petitioners who need more time to gather information, have
medical tests performed, or identify costs related to an injured child's
developmental needs., 314  Therefore, both the government and those
asking for compensation have contributed to the claim processing times.
DHHS, DOJ, and the Court of Federal Claims have taken steps to reduce
waiting times and speed up claim processing, such as producing a guide
to aid petitioners and attorneys to navigate the VICP.
315
B. The Vaccine Injury Table
Variations on the VICP's Vaccine Injury Table have been widely
used in other compensation programs, such as the Smallpox Vaccine
Injury Compensation Plan.316 Since the VICP's inception, DHHS has
made several major changes to the Vaccine Injury Table. For example,
in 1995, some injuries, such as chronic arthritis following administration
of vaccines containing rubella, were added to the Table.317 In addition,
the definition of encephalopathy was clarified.318 And, in 1997, three
new vaccines were added to the table: hepatitis B, Hemophilus
influenzae type b, and varicella. 319 At the same time, DHHS has deleted
some injuries from the Table. For example, in 1995, DHHS removed
"residual seizure disorder" following the administration of DPT or MMR
vaccines from the Table.32°
The rationale behind these changes is always published in the
Federal Register, but sometimes it is difficult to follow. In 1994 the
Institute of Medicine found "evidence of a causal relationship between
the tetanus and oral polio vaccines and Guillain-Barr6 syndrome, but
HHS did not add this condition to the injury table., 321 At the same time,
313. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 11.
314. Id.; cf Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 59, 65 (1999)
("These [time] delays compare favorably with the [time] delays encountered in civil
vaccine litigation.").
315. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 11.
316. See infra Part VI.B.
317. Vaccine Injury Table, 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1995).
318. Id.
319. Vaccine Injury Table, 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1997).
320. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine Injury
Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678 (Feb. 8, 1995) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 100).
321. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 15;
INST. OF MED., ADVERSE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH CHILDHOOD VACCINES (Kathleen R.
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the Institute of Medicine concluded that "[t]he evidence is inadequate to
accept or reject a causal relation between measles or mumps vaccine and
encephalitis or encephalopathy., 322  Yet, DHHS chose to keep
encephalopathy on the Table.323 DHHS explained the thoughts behind
these decisions in the Federal Register, stating that "decisions not to add
injuries, such as Guillain-Barr6 syndrome, or to remove injuries, such as
residual seizure disorder, were based to some extent on the level of risk
in compensating an inordinate number of non-vaccine-related cases for
the extremely rare vaccine-related case. 324  The U.S. Government
Accountability Office has expressed concern with this approach because
DHHS does not define its "assumptions about the number of potential
claims and thresholds for deciding the reasonable level of financial risk
for compensating non-vaccine-related injuries....
An additional concern about changes to the Table surfaces among
petitioners whose injury was removed from the Table. When an injury is
not listed on the Table but is believed to have resulted from a vaccine
covered by the VICP, a petitioner bears the burden of proving that the
vaccine caused the injury in question.326 In other words, the no-fault
benefit conferred by the Table is lost. About twenty-eight percent of the
petitions that the VICP receives concern these types of "off-Table"
injuries, where the petitioner bears the burden of proof.327 On average,
only thirteen percent of these petitioners receive compensation. 328 Yet,
those who suffer injuries listed on the Table have compensation rates
"nearly three times higher." 329 The difference can be attributed to the
mechanics of a no-fault system, where the petitioner does not assume the
burden of proof. As these statistics indicate, when the burden of proof is
imposed, it becomes quite difficult for a petitioner to definitively prove
that a vaccine caused the injury or death in question. This disparity
highlights the need for DHHS to seriously consider the ramifications for
petitioners before making alterations to the Vaccine Injury Table.
The Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines has begun to
address this issue by developing guidelines to aid in the process of
Stratton et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter INST. OF MED., ADVERSE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH
CHILDHOOD VACCINES].
322. INST. OF MED., ADVERSE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH CHILDHOOD VACCINES, supra
note 321, at 130.
323. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 15.
324. Id.
325. Id. 15-16.
326. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 1(c) (2006).
327. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 304, at 12.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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revising the Table. 330  In addition, the 108th and 109th Congresses
considered bills that would have increased available compensation,
including compensation for family counseling, and required DHHS to
conduct a campaign to publicize the availability of the VICP. However,
both bills died in the House Energy and Commerce Committee's
Subcommittee on Health.331
VI. Influence of the VICP on Subsequent Vaccine Programs
Despite the above criticisms, the VICP has been treated as a model
for subsequent vaccine compensation programs in the United States.
This can be attributed to several factors, including the program's
longevity and the fact that it has generally received bipartisan support in
Congress.332 As new biological threats emerge, either due to terrorism or
to the natural transmission of disease, members of Congress continue to
look to the VICP as a successful example of how to provide liability
protections to vaccine manufacturers and administrators and to
compensate those who suffer adverse effects from a vaccination.
A. Influenza
Influenza or flu, a contagious respiratory illness, affects five to
twenty percent of the American population each year, resulting in 36,000
deaths and 200,000 hospitalizations.333 Although vaccination appears to
be an effective solution to reduce morbidity and mortality from the flu,
there are many barriers to the flu vaccine's production, distribution, and
effectiveness.334
According to the CDC, multiple strains (and different variants
within each strain) of the influenza virus circulate each year.335 For
330. See supra Part II.A.
331. H.R. 1297, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1349, 108th Cong. (2003).
332. See supra Part III.
333. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Fact Sheet: Key Facts About Influenza
and the Influenza Vaccine, Sept. 28, 2005, available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/
pdf/keyfacts.pdf.
334. See, e.g., Deborah Franklin, The Give and Take of Flu Shots: Mostly Give, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at F5 ("Flu strains are constantly undergoing mutation, and the
effectiveness of the vaccine varies from year to year .. "); Michael S. Rosenwald, Flu
Crisis Sparks Fresh Look at Vaccine Production, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2004, at Al
("With a crisis sparked by the flu-shot shortage, federal health officials are eager for new,
more flexible technologies that could produce vaccine faster and more cheaply, enticing
companies to enter a market that others have largely abandoned because of poor
profits."); cf Betsy McKay & Marilyn Chase, U.S. Works to Improve Flu-Vaccine
Production, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2005, at D5 ('The current system of producing and
distributing influenza vaccine is broken, both technically and financially... [w]e need to
develop a new way to bring the private sector to the table with flu vaccine."').
335. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Influenza (Flu): Questions & Answers:
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example, influenza A (H3N2) was the dominant strain during the 2003-
04 and 2004-05 flu seasons, but influenza A (H1) and B viruses were
also present in 2004-05.336 Consequently, the influenza vaccine must
change every year to effectively prevent the disease. This is no simple
task: predicting which strain will move across the globe months ahead of
time requires international flu surveillance and even stronger
international public health systems.337
In addition to predicting the "right" influenza strain, other serious
complications arise once a strain has been identified for vaccine
production. Because the flu vaccine is only viable for one season,
production of too many doses often leads to the destruction of excess
vaccine.338 This can be costly to manufacturers who have invested
significant resources into vaccine development. 339 The actual production
of these vaccines is also highly sensitive and can be subject to serious
safety concerns.34 ° In October 2004, these issues came to a head when
Chiron, a biotechnology company, announced that it would not be able to
provide flu vaccines for the United States due to production safety
concerns. 341 As a result, vaccine shortfalls occurred across the country,
342leaving many Americans without access to flu vaccinations.
In addition to vaccine shortages and the difficulty of anticipating the
correct flu strain, vaccine injury liability concerns have affected the
influenza vaccine production market. Lack of a formalized
compensation plan for individuals injured or killed by the influenza
vaccine contributed to the reluctance of manufacturers to produce the
The Disease, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm.
336. Id.
337. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Fact Sheet: Overview of Influenza
Surveillance in the United States, June 26, 2006, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/pdf/flu-surveillance-overview.pdf.
338. Editorial, An Influenza Vaccine Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2004, at A26
("The main problem is that influenza vaccine needs to be reformulated every year, and
companies suffer huge losses if they overestimate the amount that will be needed because
they end up having to destroy millions of doses.").
339. Id.
340. Rosenwald, supra note 334 ("Cell culture vaccines may hold safety advantages.
Unlike those produced in chicken eggs, some cell culture vaccines are not processed with
chemicals that can cause rare side effects, and people with egg allergies won't have
dangerous reactions to them.").
341. Sarah Lueck & Pui-Wing Tam, FDA Concurs that Chiron Flu Vaccine is
Unusable, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at A2 ("Federal health officials said none of
Chiron Corp.'s flu vaccine is safe for use, after their inspection of the biotechnology
company's plant in Liverpool, England, uncovered manufacturing defects and bacterial
contamination.").
342. SARAH A. LISTER & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, INFLUENZA VACCINE SHORTAGES AND
IMPLICATIONS 1-2 (2004), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//
data/2004/upl-meta-crs-6128/RL32655_20040ct29.pdf
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vaccine. 343 In the latter half of 2004, Congress considered adding the flu
vaccine to the list of vaccines covered by the VICP. 34 4 This would mean
that any person who received an enumerated injury due to the flu vaccine
within a time period specified by the Vaccine Injury Table fell under the
purview of the VICP. To receive compensation, an injured person would
first file a petition with the VICP, through the Court of Federal Claims.345
The subsequent processes for moving a flu vaccine claim through the
system would be the same as those described above for childhood
vaccine-related injuries.
346
During hearings on the proposed legislation, members of Congress
suggested that concerns about litigation costs had driven flu vaccine
manufacturers from the market: "[W]hy have we gone from just three or
four [flu vaccine] manufacturers down to just one? Perhaps the
manufacturers just decided 'I'm going to throw up my hands. I'm not
going to deal with this. I don't want the litigation. It's too much
hassle,"' said Representative Cliff Stems (R-FL).347 Indeed, Congress
responded to these types of liability concerns in late 2004, when it passed
legislation that added the flu vaccine to vaccines covered by the VICP.
348
President Bush signed the law on October 22, 2004.349
And yet, as of February 2006, only four companies were producing
the influenza vaccine worldwide, with only two conducting operations in
the United States. 350 This current lack of manufacturer participation in
the flu vaccine market suggests that liability concerns were not as crucial
to manufacturers as the American public and Congress supposed. A
recent survey of judicial opinions found "only ten reported cases [of flu
vaccine-related litigation] in the last 20 years.",351 While reported cases,
which are those that resulted in either a jury verdict or a judicial opinion,
represent only a fraction of total claims, they do offer "a sense of how
[flu-vaccine] cases are faring in court., 352  Nearly all of the reported
343. See Flu Vaccine Shortage Builds as Election Issue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2004,
at B4 ("Liability concerns ... are to blame for a shortage of flu shots this year, Vice
President Dick Cheney said during a campaign stop at a West Virginia restaurant.").
344. H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004).
345. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(a) (2006).
346. See supra Part II.B.
347. The Flu Vaccine: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Health and Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 2 (2004)
(statement of Rep. Cliff Stems).
348. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 890, 118 Stat.
1418, 1644 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4132(a)(1)(N) (2004)).
349. Bills Signed, 2004 CONG. Q. 2567.
350. Gostin, supra note 305, at 554.
351. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Legal Concerns and the Influenza
Vaccine Shortage, 294 JAMA 1817, 1819 (2005).
352. Id.
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cases "settled for ... [small] amounts or were resolved by the courts on
summary judgment." 353 This track record and the addition of the flu
vaccine to the VICP should have alleviated most liability concerns for flu
vaccine manufacturers. Therefore, the current small number of flu
vaccine manufacturers implies that other issues, such as the difficulty of
determining which strain of the flu will appear each year, outweigh
liability concerns for these companies.
B. Smallpox
Although smallpox was officially eradicated worldwide in 1980, it
is still a feared and highly infectious disease.354 In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks, and the anthrax attack on the U.S. Capitol
one month later, smallpox fears resurfaced.355 Reports that rogue nations
had illegally obtained stockpiles of smallpox appeared in the media.
356
In response to these fears and recommendations from the CDC's
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices,357 President George W.
Bush announced his plan for a smallpox vaccination program on
December 13, 2002, and signed the program into law on April 30,
2003.358 The program called for the vaccination of health care workers,
emergency response personnel, and military personnel who would be the
first responders for the general population in the case of an intentional
release of smallpox.
359
353. Id.
354. Zack S. Moore et al., Smallpox, 367 LANCET 425, 425 (2006).
355. E.g., Terence Chea, Investing in National Security; Local Labs' Vaccines, Other
Products Have New Relevance, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2001, at T5; Brad Smith, Health
Experts Weigh Bioterrorism Threats, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 12, 2001, at 1 ("With anthrax
scares down sharply, public health officials say smallpox-not anthrax-is bioterrorism's
deadliest potential threat.").
356. Judith Miller & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Nation Challenged: The Strategy; Sept.
II Attacks Led to Push for More Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at I
("Although smallpox was eradicated as a disease in the 1970's, American intelligence
had suspected for years that Iraq and North Korea, and possibly other rogue nations, had
maintained clandestine stocks of the deadly smallpox virus."); John Fialka et al., Are We
Prepared for the Unthinkable?-Officials Fear U.S. Ill-equipped To Cope With
Biological or Chemical Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2001, at BI ("The gravest fear
is that... terrorist kingpins might acquire weapons from a rogue state such as Iraq, Libya
or Sudan, all of which have pursued the development of chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons [.]").
357. Vaccinia (Smallpox) Vaccine: Recommendation of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2001, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-
10, June 22, 2001, at 17-21.
358. Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117
Stat. 638 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2006)); Bush Will Offer Public
Vaccine for Smallpox, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A10.
359. Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117
Stat. 638; Remembering Smallpox: Lessons Learned from the State Experience, Ass'n of
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Despite initial strong public support,36° cracks soon appeared in the
plan. As of June 2003, the Department of Defense had vaccinated
350,000 military personnel and only 37,487 civilians against smallpox.
361
The White House had anticipated that more than 500,000 civilians would
voluntarily agree to be vaccinated.362
Several theories exist as to why vaccination rates were so low. The
first theory involves practical limitations to the CDC's highly ambitious
vaccination plan. In early 2003, the CDC anticipated that 500,000 health
care workers would be vaccinated within the first thirty days of the
smallpox vaccination program.363 However, many state and local
jurisdictions did not receive the smallpox vaccine on time. 364 In addition,
technical issues, such as database system incompatibility, led to fewer
health care workers receiving vaccinations.365
Other theories concern fears about the smallpox vaccine's side
effects. The smallpox vaccine carries significant health risks. Because
the vaccine is composed of living vaccinia virus,366 it poses unique
threats to those who receive it. 367 One thousand out of every 1,000,000
persons who receive the vaccine will experience serious health effects
such as toxic/allergic reactions. 368 More seriously, the CDC anticipated
that one to two of every 1,000,000 persons vaccinated would die as a
result of the vaccine.369
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, lack of
adequate compensation for injuries incurred via vaccination was ranked
highly as a reason for low civilian participation in the vaccination
program. 370 These concerns were echoed by several organizations,
State & Territorial Health Officials Issue Brief, Oct. 2004, at 1-2, available at
http://www.astho.org/pubs/SmallpoxLessonsLeamed20.pdf?PHPSESSID=bafb6ad.
360. See, e.g., Anita Manning, U.S. Readies Offensive Against Smallpox Threat, USA
TODAY, July 31, 2002, at D8 ("With more than 350,000 truckers [that the Teamsters] ...
represent, we would certainly support having our members vaccinated[.]").
361. SUSAN THAUL, SMALLPOX VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION 1-2 (2003), available
at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/smallpox/Congress/RL3 1960.pdf.
362. Id.
363. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., SMALLPOX VACCINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF
NATIONAL PROGRAM FACES CHALLENGES 1 (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03578.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., SMALLPOX
VACCINATION].
364. Id. at 4.
365. Id.
366. Who Will Pay for the Adverse Events Resulting from Smallpox Vaccination?,
supra note 303, at 3.
367. Id.
368. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Smallpox Fact Sheet, Mar. 31, 2003, at
2, available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/pdf/vaccine-
overview.pdf.
369. Id.
370. U.S. Gov. ACCT. OFF., SMALLPOX VACCINATION, supra note 363, at 4-5.
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
including the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials and the
National Association of City and County Health Officials, both of which
described a need for a compensation plan that would protect civilians
who participated in the smallpox vaccination program.3 7' Specifically,
several stakeholders including state officials, public health officers, the
American College of Emergency Physicians, and health care worker
unions suggested a federally funded, no-fault compensation system
modeled, in part, on the VICP.
3 72
In response to these concerns, Congress took steps in the first few
months of 2003 to enact legislation that would compensate individuals
who were injured or killed after receiving a smallpox vaccination.373
Congress looked to existing compensation programs, such as the VICP,
to help craft a smallpox vaccine injury compensation plan.374 As a result,
two major proposals were drafted. H.R. 865, the Smallpox Vaccine
Compensation and Safety Act of 2003, was introduced by Representative
Henry Waxman on February 13, 2003, and drew heavily on Waxman's
previous work with the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.
Waxman's plan, like the VICP, suggested that special masters, appointed
by the Court of Federal Claims, would hear each vaccine injury claim.
376
Available compensation would include lost wages, medical expenses,
and a one-time $250,000 payment for non-economic damages.377 In
addition, if a person died due to the smallpox vaccine, an $850,000 death
benefit would be paid.378  The bill mandated and authorized the
appropriations that would pay for the compensation program.
379
Unfortunately, elements of the VICP did not easily translate to
smallpox vaccine injury compensation. For example, the National
Health Policy Forum anticipated that funding issues would likely arise
because Waxman's plan for smallpox injuries would include lost wages
whereas childhood vaccine injury-related compensation lacked
reimbursement for missed work. 380 Furthermore, while part of the VICP
371. Who Will Pay for the Adverse Events Resulting from Smallpox Vaccination?,
supra note 303, at 8-9.
372. Id. at 11.
373. E.g., Kate Schuler, First Responders' Apprehension Slows Progress With
Smallpox Vaccination Plan, 2003 CONG. Q. 705 [hereinafter Schuler, First Responders];
Kate Schuler, Smallpox Compensation Fund Gets Through Senate Committee After
Surprise Rejection in House, 2003 CONG. Q. 828 [hereinafter Schuler, Smallpox
Compensation].
374. THAUL, supra note 361, at 5.
375. H.R. 865, 108th Cong. (2003).
376. Id. § 4(a).
377. THAUL, supra note 361, at 10.
378. H.R. 865, 108th Cong. § 4(a) (2003).
379. Id.; THAUL, supra note 361, at 10.
380. Who Will Pay for the Adverse Events Resulting from Smallpox Vaccination?,
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funding scheme is paid by an excise tax on the vaccines themselves, this
tax would not be possible with smallpox vaccines as the vaccine would
be purchased by the federal government rather than by individuals.38'
These concerns contributed to the bill's failure. It died in the House
Education and Workforce Committee's Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections.
The administration-favored proposal,38 2 S. 719,383 the Smallpox
Emergency Personnel Protection Act, was submitted by Senator Judd
Gregg (R-NH) on March 26, 2003. The plan assigned administrative
responsibility for the compensation program to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services and did not provide for judicial review of any
procedures developed by the Secretary.384 Similar to the VICP, the bill
required the Secretary to develop a vaccine injury table with timeframes
385
for specific injuries that could occur after a smallpox vaccination.
Gregg's plan was less financially generous than Waxman's. Available
compensation was divided into three categories: medical benefits, lost
employment income, and death or permanent disability. The medical
benefit included "medical items and services as reasonable and
necessary" to treat a vaccine-injured person.386 Lost employment income
would be compensated at two-thirds for a person with no dependents and
at seventy-five percent for a person with dependents. The total
compensation for lost employment income could not exceed $50,000.387
Compensation for death or permanent disability would be paid in a one-
time lump sum of $262,100, minus payments made for lost employment
income.388
The bill squeaked through the Senate's Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions with an 1 1-10 vote. 389 Democrats voiced
strong opposition to the bill and wanted "higher funding levels for
injured workers., 390 Despite these concerns, Democrats and Republicans
were anxious to pass a smallpox compensation bill because the issue had
become "the biggest prize in the race to show support for emergency
workers and preparedness programs., 391  This sentiment led to the
supra note 303, at 12.
381. Id.
382. Schuler, Smallpox Compensation, supra note 373, at 828 (referring to bill as
"Bush's vaccination program").
383. S. 719, 108th Cong. (2003).
384. Id. §2.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Schuler, Smallpox Compensation, supra note 373, at 828.
390. Id.
391. Id.
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introduction of H.R. 1770,392 a compromise bill, by Representative
Richard Burr (R-NC) on April 11, 2003. The bill specified that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services would "establish procedures"
for carrying out the smallpox vaccination compensation program.
393
Judicial review of these procedures was prohibited.394 To be eligible for
compensation, an individual would have to suffer an enumerated injury
within a prescribed period of time, as indicated on the smallpox vaccine
injury table.395 Available compensation would include the following:
1) medical benefits, including "medical items and services as reasonable
and necessary to treat a covered injury of an eligible individual,
including the services, appliances, and supplies prescribed or
recommended by a qualified physician. .. ,,;396 2) lost employment
income compensated at two-thirds for those with no dependents and at
seventy-five percent for those with dependents; 397 and 3) for those who
died after receiving a smallpox vaccination, a death benefit of
$262,100. 3 9' The total compensation in this category would not exceed
$50,000 for any one year.399 While any payment for lost income would
be subtracted from the death benefit, any payment or reimbursement for
medical care would be made in addition to the death benefit.400
This slightly more generous compensation program was signed into
law by President Bush on April 30, 2003.401 However, despite the
passage of the law and the appropriation of $42 million to provide
402compensation, vaccination rates for civilian first responders did not
show any real signs of improvement in the following months. 3 This
can be attributed to several lingering issues. First, as the administration
shifted its focus to the war in Iraq, it "did not [continue to] convey a
sense of urgency about the possibility of a smallpox outbreak.... [As a
392. H.R. 1770, 108th Cong. (2003).
393. Id. § 2.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. H.R. 1770, 108th Cong. (2003); THAUL, supra note 361, at 12.
399. H.R. 1770, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
400. THAUL, supra note 361, at 12-13.
401. Id. at 11; Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-20, 117 Stat. 638 (2003).
402. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Fact Sheet: Smallpox Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, http://www.hrsa.gov/smallpoxinjury/fact.htm (last visited Aug.
4, 2006).
403. E.g., Christian Davenport, Fears About Smallpox Shots May Put Public at Risk,
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at CI ("'There was really very little interest on the part of
first-responder groups to receive the vaccine,' said Lisa Kaplowitz, the Virginia
Department of Health's deputy commissioner for emergency preparedness and response.
'It wasn't zero, but really very little interest."').
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result,] the medical community did not take on board the real possibility
of a smallpox outbreak. ''404 Thus, the efforts of people responsible for
vaccinating first responders slowly dissipated. In addition, potential
vaccinees remained concerned about the vaccine's possible side
effects.4 °5 In fact, as of October 31, 2005, only 39,608 civilians had
406received the smallpox vaccine.
C. Project Bioshield
After the anthrax attacks of 2001, many in government and industry
recognized that the United States lacked effective medical
countermeasures for a variety of biological threats, such as botulinum
toxin and plague.40 7 In addition, experts concurred that the country had
not developed sufficient stockpiles for known threats, such as anthrax.408
As a result, in early 2003, Senator Judd Gregg introduced Project
Bioshield,4 °9 which tried to address some of these issues. The bill
contained provisions to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop
new drugs and vaccines to combat biological threats.410 The legislation
404. Editorial, Smallpox Fiasco, WASH. POST, July 14, 2003, at A20.
405. E.g., Davenport, supra note 403 ("Officials said people are reluctant to volunteer
to be vaccinated because of risks associated with the vaccine, which has been linked to
several cases of a potentially fatal heart inflammation.").
406. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Smallpox Vaccination Program Status
by State, http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/smallpox/spvaccin.htm (last visited
Jan. 21, 2007); cf MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1985)
(explaining importance of symbolism to policy development).
407. Editorial, Smallpox and Beyond, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2002, at A15 ("The
terrorist goal is to kill, using whatever is available-anthrax, the plague, botulinum toxin,
tularemia, ebola, Lassa fever, Yellow fever, Rift Valley fever, brucela. The U.S. lacks
effective vaccines and therapies for many of these."); Denise Grady, Bioterror Agents
Join List of 'Emerging' Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at Fl ("Now, anthrax and other
potential bioterror agents-smallpox, plague, tularemia, botulism, Q fever and the Ebola
and Marburg viruses-have been added to the ranks of emerging infectious disease [by
the CDC].").
408. Reed Abelson & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: The Medical Stockpile;
Concerns About How Quickly the U.S. Can Deliver Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at
B8 ("For all the government's talk about a stockpile of antibiotics and other medical
supplies that can be delivered anywhere in the nation in 12 hours, it is not at all clear that
federal officials can actually get drugs or medical supplies to millions of Americans that
quickly."); Guy Gugliotta, No Decision on Anthrax Vaccine Program; Pentagon Weighs
Military, Civilian Needs Against Limited Supply, Says It's 'Close' to Resolving Issue,
WASH. POST, May 20, 2002, at A2 ("[Defense] Department sources say limitations on
vaccine supplies and production capacity will make it impossible to start all 2.4 million
of the nation's military personnel at once on the cumbersome six-dose course of
injections required for full immunization.").
409. S. 15, 108th Cong. (2003).
410. FRANK GOTTRON, PROJECT BIOSHIELD, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP., at 2 (2005),
available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21507.pdf.; For the Record, WASH. POST, July
22, 2004, at T24 ("[Project Bioshield] streamlines contracting rules and provides
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"provides expedited procedures for bioterrorism-related procurement,
hiring, and awarding of research grants, making it easier for the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to quickly commit
substantial funds to countermeasure projects., 41 1 A companion bill, H.R.
2122,412 was introduced by Representative Billy Tauzin (R-LA) on May
15, 2003.
During hearings on the proposed legislation, representatives of
pharmaceutical companies repeatedly mentioned the need for protection
from liability should their countermeasures cause an adverse reaction in a
recipient. As Frank Rapoport, an attorney representing Aventis Pasteur
explained,
The issue of potential liability for any entity that provides, or
performs research and development related to, Biodefense
countermeasures absolutely must be addressed in order to stimulate
private sector interest in entering into agreements for such
countermeasures. Our experience was that the absence of liability
protection was a major obstacle in the recent procurement by NIH for
development of the next-generation Anthrax vaccine and continues to
be a major hurdle for our company.413
Legislators appeared less concerned about liability protections. During
debates about the bill, liability issues were rarely mentioned. And, the
bill's accompanying House Report "encourage[ed] the Secretaries [of
HHS and the Department of Homeland Security] to indicate in any call
for proposals the potential availability of indemnification or liability
protections under other laws., 41 4 However, the "other laws" provide
indemnification against lawsuits by those who are adversely affected by
a countermeasure only after the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security makes a declaration that there is an "actual or
potential bioterrorist incident or other actual or potential public health
emergency.,, 41 5 Because this type of provision does "not apply to harm
financial incentives to encourage companies to develop pharmaceuticals and other
countermeasures that have no broad commercial application.").
411. GOTTRON,supra note 410, at2.
412. H.R. 2122, 108th Cong. (2003).
413. Project BioShield: Contracting for the Health and Security of the American
Public: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov. Reform, 108th Cong. 74-75 (2003)
(testimony of Frank Rapoport, Attorney on behalf of Aventis Pasteur); see also
Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 56 (2003) ("[T]he Government must assure
private sector partners that they will not be exposed to a risk of litigation out of
proportion to the rewards for success.").
414. H.R. REP. No. 108-147 (2003).
415. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 304(c), 116 Stat. 2135,
2166 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2002)).
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caused when no act of terrorism has occurred, [] it may not cover
products, such as vaccines..., deployed when an attack is only
suspected or threatened."
416
Project Bioshield was signed into law on July 21, 2004,417 and
members of Congress implied that they would eventually revisit the issue
of manufacturer indemnification. 418 However, the current Congress has
taken few definitive steps in this direction.419 Consequently, it should
perhaps not be surprising that many vaccine manufacturers have stayed
out of the novel vaccine production market. Although Project Bioshield
allocated $5.6 billion for contracts with drug manufacturers, DHHS has
signed only four contracts to date, totaling approximately $1 billion.42°
In addition to lack of manufacturer liability protections, the Project
Bioshield legislation offers no compensation package to those who are
injured after receiving a vaccination or other countermeasure. This
omission can be attributed to the fact that the smallpox vaccine
compensation program was being developed at the same time that
legislators were debating the Project Bioshield bill.421 After witnessing
how controversial the smallpox vaccine compensation program was,
legislators shied away from introducing that type of program with Project
Bioshield 2  Instead, priority was placed on passing the Project
Bioshield program so that the government could begin contracting with
drug companies who were willing to develop countermeasures. 423  To
date, Congress has not passed legislation that would create a
compensation program for those injured by Project Bioshield vaccines or
countermeasures.
D. Avian Flu
Vaccine compensation concerns arose again in 2005-06 as avian flu
416. GOTTRON,supra note 410, at5.
417. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2004)).
418. Rebecca Adams, Bioterrorism Bill Advances with Hybrid Funding Plan, 2003
CONG. Q. 1190 ("Tauzin said that he would have 'loved to put liability protections in [the
Project Bioshield bill],' but that such a controversial move could doom the bill. He
predicted that Congress will revisit the issue at a later date.").
419. In April 2005, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) introduced S. 975, which
would have added some liability protections for manufacturers who receive Project
Bioshield contracts. S. 975, 109th Cong. (2005). However, this bill has received little
attention and appears to have died in the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions.
420. Rebecca Adams, Project Bioshield: A Second Look, 2006 CONG. Q. 234.
421. Schuler, First Responders, supra note 373, at 705.
422. 2003 Legislative Summary: Project Bioshield, 2003 CONG. Q. 3122.
423. Schuler, First Responders, supra note 373, at 705.
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(H5NI) rapidly spread across the globe.424 Avian flu occurs primarily in
birds, but it is the first known influenza strain that is able to cross the
species barrier and infect and kill humans.425 In fact, scientists have
drawn similarities between H5N1 and the flu of 1918 that killed
approximately two percent of the world's population.426  While there
have not been any reported cases of avian flu in the United States,
according to the World Health Organization, 205 cases and 113 deaths
had been reported worldwide as of April 27, 2006.427 As H5N1 makes
its way around the world, efforts are underway at the CDC and other
government agencies to prepare the United States for the eventual arrival
of what is now known as the pandemic flu.
428
On November 1, 2005, President Bush unveiled a National Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza. 429  The plan listed the following goals:
"1) stopping, slowing or otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to
the United States; 2) limiting the domestic spread of a pandemic, and
mitigating disease, suffering and death; and 3) sustaining infrastructure
and mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society.
430
The plan includes provisions to "purchase stockpiles of vaccines and
antiviral drugs, and accelerate the development of new vaccine
technologies.... ,,431 However, in its current form, the plan contains no
compensation provisions for those who are injured by a pandemic flu
vaccine nor does it offer liability protection to pandemic flu vaccine
424. E.g., Susan Levine, D.C. Plans Summit on Pandemic Response; Meeting April
28 is Part of Effort to Coordinate Business, School, Religious Groups, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 2006, at B4.
With the spread of avian flu across the globe, and the threat posed should the
deadly H5N1 strain mutate to allow human-to-human transmission, the federal
government is urging states, cities and even neighborhoods to ready themselves
for the extended and extensive disruption a pandemic could cause in every
aspect of daily life.
Id.
425. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Key Facts About Avian Influenza (Bird
Flu) and Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, Feb. 7, 2006, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm.
426. SARAH A. LISTER, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS,
CONG. RES. SERVICE REP., at 1 (2005), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs
homesec/RL33145.pdf.
427. World Health Org., Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian
Influenza A/(H5NJ) Reported to WHO (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://www.who.int/
csr/disease/avianinfluenza/country/cases table_2006 04 27/en/index.html.
428. E.g., Betsy McKay, CDC Proposes Traveler Database to Help Fight Infectious
Diseases, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 23, 2005, at D4 ("The [CDC] proposed requiring airlines
and cruise lines to hand over names, home addresses and other information about
passengers and crew to help public-health officials track down people who might have
been exposed to infectious diseases such as avian flu.").
429. LISTER, supra note 426, at 13.
430. Id.
431 Id.
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manufacturers.432
Although Congress added the influenza vaccine to the VICP in
2004, 433 this does not mean that a pandemic flu vaccine is covered as
well. The VICP covers trivalent flu vaccine, which is "the annual
vaccine that contains three strains. 434 A pandemic flu vaccine would be
monovalent, or singled-strained, which would not fall under the VICP. 4 3 5
Although influenza vaccines carry a low risk of adverse side effects, 436 a
plan that does not contain compensation provisions for those injured by
the vaccine could deter first responders and the general public from
being vaccinated. In addition, manufacturers may be reluctant to enter
the market if they fear costly lawsuits from those who experience a
vaccine's adverse effects.
As a result of these concerns, the 109th Congress is considering
several bills that would address liability and compensation concerns. For
example, on December 16, 2005, Representative Nita M. Lowey (D-NY)
introduced the Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Act of 2005. 43 7 In the
event that the United States government declares a state of flu pandemic,
the bill would establish a compensation system for those injured by the
pandemic flu vaccine.438 It would be modeled on the VICP, including a
Vaccine Injury Table. However, payments for compensation would be
drawn exclusively from appropriations and not from an excise tax. In
addition, the bill would protect pandemic flu vaccine manufacturers and
administrators by requiring people to pursue compensation through the
VICP-modeled program first. 439 The bill has fifty-one co-sponsors and,
in early May 2006, was referred to the House Education and Workforce
Committee's Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness. Partisan
disagreement about this type of program concerns the extent of liability
protection for manufacturers and the amount of compensation available
for vaccine-injured persons.440  However, because there is generally
bipartisan agreement that manufacturer liability and victim compensation
provisions are necessary for a successful pandemic flu program,441 it is
likely that this type of proposed legislation will eventually pass.
432. Id. at 27-29.
433. See supra Part VI.A.
434. LISTER, supra note 426, at 28.
435. Id.
436. John J. Treanor et al., Safety and Immunogenicity of an Inactivated Subvirion
Influenza A (H5N1) Vaccine, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1343, 1343-51 (2006).
437. H.R. 4603, 109th Cong. (2005).
438. Id. § 101.
439. See id.
440. Kate Schuler, 2005 Legislative Summary: Pandemic Flu Preparedness, 2006
CONG. Q. 43.
441. Id.
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VII. Conclusion
As the preceding examples illustrate, vaccine manufacturer liability
protections and victim compensation remain controversial and timely
issues. With this understanding, it is helpful to revisit the story of how
Congress created the United States' longest-running and most successful
vaccine compensation program, the VICP. With the swine flu episode
only a decade behind them, it took members of Congress over three years
to create and pass the VICP legislation. As the application of theoretical
frameworks demonstrated, this passage can be attributed to numerous
factors, including 1) a problem definition that concerned the need to
protect American children from preventable diseases; 2) a coalescing of
bipartisan interests around this idea; 3) the work of policy entrepreneurs
Paula Hawkins and Henry Waxman; 4) the softening up process that had
prepared stakeholders and members of Congress for this type of
legislation; 5) the strategic packaging of the VICP in omnibus legislation
that included initiatives desired by the Reagan administration; and 6) the
opening of a new policy window to establish a long-term funding stream
for the VICP when the Democrats regained control of the Senate and
President Reagan's veto threat had significantly weakened.
Given emerging biological threats, such as smallpox and avian flu,
it is virtually inevitable that Congress will create vaccine injury
compensation programs in the near future. In anticipation of these
events, lawmakers can draw on the experiences of past Congresses that
have considered vaccine compensation programs. As the recent
examples of influenza, smallpox, Project Bioshield, and avian flu have
shown, vaccine manufacturers will not automatically invest in combating
a new disease. Without sufficient liability protections, they are apt to
avoid the market entirely. At the same time, first responders and other
likely vaccinees will shun new vaccinations if no plan exists to
compensate them should they be injured by the vaccines. And, even if a
plan exists, it must offer compensation that vaccinees will perceive as
appropriate to the risks posed by the vaccine. These lessons and the
story of the VICP will help stakeholders and lawmakers to craft future
immunization programs that will successfully protect the public's health,
stabilize the market for vaccine development and distribution, and
provide compensation to those who are injured by a government-
recommended vaccine.
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Vaccine
Appendix A
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
Vaccine Injury Tablea
Adverse Event Time Interval
I. Tetanus toxoid-
containing vaccines (e.g.,
DTaP, Tdap, DTP-Hib,
DT, Td, TT)
11. Pertussis antigen-
containing vaccines
(e.g., DTaP, Tdap,
DTP, P, DTP-Hib)
111. Measles, mumps
and rubella virus-
containing vaccines in
any combination (e.g.,
MMR, MR, M, R)
IV. Rubella virus-
containing vaccines
(e.g., MMR, MR, R)
A. Anaphylaxis or
anaphylactic shock
B. Brachial neuritis
C. Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above events
A. Anaphylaxis or
anaphylactic shock
B. Encephalopathy (or
encephalitis)
C. Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above events
A. Anaphylaxis or
anaphylactic shock
B. Encephalopathy (or
encephalitis)
C. Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above events
A. Chronic arthritis
B Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above event
0-4 hours
2-28 days
Not applicable
0-4 hours
0-72 hours
Not applicable
0-4 hours
5-15 days
Not applicable
7-42 days
Not applicable
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V. Measles virus-
containing vaccines
(e.g., MMR, MR, M)
VI. Polio live virus-
containing vaccines
(OPV)
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A Thrombocytopenic
purpura
B. Vaccine-Strain Measles
Viral Infection in an
immunodeficient recipient
C Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above events
A. Paralytic polio
-- in a non-
immunodeficient recipient
-- in an immunodeficient
recipient
-- in a vaccine assoc.
community case
B. Vaccine-strain polio
viral infection
-- in a non-
immunodeficient recipient
-- in an immunodeficient
recipient
-- in a vaccine assoc.
community case
C. Any acute complication
or sequela
(including death) of above
events
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7-30 days
0-6 months
Not applicable
0-30 days
0-6 months
Not applicable
0-30 days
0-6 months
Not applicable
Not applicable
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VII. Polio inactivated-
virus containing
vaccines (e.g., IPV)
A Anaphylaxis or
anaphylactic shock
B. Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above event
VIII. Hepatitis B
antigen-containing
vaccines
IX. Hemophilus
influenzae type b
polysaccharide
conjugate vaccines
X. Varicella vaccine
XI. Rotavirus vaccine
XII. Vaccines
containing live, oral,
rhesus-based rotavirus
XIII. Pneumococcal
conjugate vaccines
XIV. Any new vaccine
recommended by the
Centers for Disease
Control and
A. Anaphylaxis or
anaphylactic shock
B. Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above event
A. No condition specified
for compensation
A. No condition specified
for compensation
A. No condition specified
for compensation
A. Intussusception
B. Any acute complication
or sequela (including
death) of above event
A. No condition specified
for compensation
0-4 hours
Not applicable
0-4 hours
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
0-30 days
Not applicable
Not applicable
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Prevention for routine
administration to
children, after
publication by
Secretary, HHS of a
notice of coverageb
'Effective date: July 1, 2005
bAs of December 1, 2004, hepatitis A vaccines have been added to the Vaccine Injury Table
(Table) under this Category. As of July 1, 2005, trivalent influenza vaccines have been added to the
Table under this Category. Trivalent influenza vaccines are given annually during the flu season
either by needle and syringe or in a nasal spray. All influenza vaccines routinely administered in the
U.S. are trivalent vaccines covered under this Category. See News on the VICP website for more
information (www.hrsa.gov/osp/vicp).
Source: 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2006); Health Servs. & Res. Admin., National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act Vaccine Injury Table, http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/table.htm.
